NJ court considers: Are e-scooter riders ‘pedestrians?’
The plaintiff was injured while operating an LSES and claimed PIP benefits under his automobile liability policy. Progressive denied the claim.
A “pedestrian” as defined in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(a) is any person who is injured while occupying, entering into, or alighting from a vehicle (a) propelled by other than muscular power and (b) designed primarily for use on highways, rails or tracks. Mandatory PIP coverage in motor vehicle policies must be provided if the injured person matches that definition in the statute.
Motorcycle riders do not qualify for PIP benefits because motorcycles are not automobiles. N.J.S.A. 39:1-1. Bicyclists are deemed “pedestrians,” although bicycles are propelled by muscle power, because the Legislature wanted to give bicyclists PIP coverage. On the other hand, operators of mopeds, although peddled for the purpose of engaging the motor, are not pedestrians. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(h).
But there is another category of vehicles, known as low-speed electric scooters (LSES), and this is what the court had before it in Goyco. Plaintiff David Goyco was injured while operating an LSES, a vehicle that has two wheels connected by a floor board, handlebars, a headlight, brake light, speedometer and electric motor. Goyco claimed PIP benefits under his automobile liability policy and Progressive denied the claim because an LSES (1) does not meet the definition of “automobile” and (2) because Goyco could not be considered a “pedestrian” by statutory definition. The court held that such an LSES was neither a motor vehicle nor a bicycle powered by human propulsion.
Goyco asserted that LSES riders should nevertheless be deemed “pedestrians” entitled to PIP benefits in light of the 2019 enactment of N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g), which provides that an LSES should be considered for some purposes as the equivalent of a bicycle. Therefore, persons who operate them should be deemed pedestrians under the No-Fault Act except in instances where the statute clearly did not apply to an LSES.
Plaintiff’s policy arguments asserted that the No-Fault Act was enacted as social legislation and, therefore, should be liberally construed to provide PIP coverage as a social necessity by giving it broad application to the Legislature’s intent, consistent with certain of the act’s statutory language. The court countered by stating that, although the goal of assuring medical coverage is a key theme of the act, it must be balanced against the statute’s other main goal, which was containment of the rising cost of automobile insurance, and that although expanding the definition of “pedestrian” would advance the medical coverage goal, it would undermine the goal of curbing the rising cost of insurance premiums. Therefore, the Legislature had the right to expand availability of PIP coverage to LSES operators, as they did with bicycles, but that is a decision which lays with the Legislature rather than with the court.
The court concluded that neither the plain text nor legislative history suggested that the Legislature intended an LSES to be a motor vehicle or the equivalent of a bicycle or an automobile. Therefore, operators are not pedestrians or automobile users for purposes of PIP coverage.
We think that the court got it right. By using ordinary rules of construction and analyzing placement of the statutory terms, and the terms themselves, Goyco did not qualify for PIP benefits.
But the court observed that if the Legislature deems its intention was not as expressed by the court, it could incorporate operators of LSES vehicles within the scope of PIP coverage by enacting the appropriate legislation, as it had with bicycles.