Worker's intoxication not the 'proximate cause' of workplace injuries

The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the worker’s accident would have happened even if he hadn't been drinking before clocking in.

The injured worker testified that the property owner had distributed drugs and that “beer [was] readily available on site.” The paramedic who treated Adams at the scene of the accident confirmed Adams had admitted to drinking alcohol before work that day, but testified that Adams had exhibited none of the typical signs of intoxication. (Credit: Bigstock)
The Alaska Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a workers’ compensation verdict for a man who, though he admitted to being intoxicated shortly before the incident, had a compensable injury because it would have happened whether or not he was intoxicated. 

Virgil Adams fell 30 feet when the supports beneath the ladder he was standing on collapsed; the fall left him totally and permanently disabled. Hospital tests revealed, and Adams freely admitted, that he had both cocaine and alcohol in his system at the time of the accident. Adams also admitted that he had not examined the cribbing before climbing up the ladder. There was no workers’ compensation policy in place, so Adams filed a claim with the Workers Compensation Fund, which denied his claim based on the presence of the drugs. 

Adams testified that the property owner had distributed the drugs, and that “beer [was] readily available on site.” The paramedic who treated Adams at the scene of the accident confirmed Adams had admitted to drinking alcohol before work that day, but testified that Adams had exhibited none of the typical signs of intoxication, such as slurred speech or bloodshot eyes.

The doctor called upon by the fund made two reports relating to the incident. The first revealed little helpful information. All the doctor could say with certainty was that the urine sample indicated cocaine use two to three days before the accident, and that there was insufficient information concerning the manner and timing of the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test to conclude there was more than “some degree of impairment from alcohol.”

His second report, for which more information was available, revealed no additional information on the cocaine use, but did show that Adams’s BAC had been around 0.07 at the time of the accident. The doctor agreed that this level of impairment would have had a negative impact on Adams’ judgment, but that he still had no way to determine how much time had passed between Adam’s last drink and his fall. 

The Workers’ Compensation Board determined that it was the defective supports beneath the ladder, and not Adams’ intoxication, that led to his fall. The doctor’s opinions were not dispositive of how Adams would have been affected by the drugs and alcohol, the board said, and the Workers Compensation Fund had presented more information concerning the fact of Adams’ intoxication than of “how [his] intoxication proximately caused the injuries.” They found “no logical connection” between Adams’ intoxication, the faulty ladder supports and the fall. Adams was awarded a majority of the requested benefits. 

The decision bounced around between the Workers Compensation Commission, the Supreme Court of Alaska, and the board before it came back before the Supreme Court of Alaska for a second time. The commission had affirmed the second decision of the board, relying on statutory language that said intoxication at the time of a workplace accident, when standing alone, was not a complete defense to an injury, and that the intoxication itself must have been “the proximate cause of the injury” in order to be an affirmative defense against an injured employee’s claim. The evidence still showed that the main cause of Adams’ injury was inadequate support for his ladder. 

The Alaska Supreme Court pointed out that the state Workers’ Compensation Act contained a presumption that an injured worker’s intoxication was not the proximate cause of a workplace injury, unless the employer presented “substantial evidence to the contrary.” The justices further explained that the fund’s argument that Adams had been too impaired to check the ladder supports only served to strengthen the counter-argument that the supports had been unstable at the time of the accident and were a more proximate cause of the injuries than his impairment. The fund also made arguments concerning the alleged lack of weight given to the doctor’s testimony and witness credibility, but the court was unpersuaded. They affirmed the commission’s decision in Adams’s favor. 

Insurance Coverage Law Center editor’s note: The Alaska Supreme Court made an important distinction between intoxication and workplace injuries in this case. Intoxication as an affirmative defense requires two things: First, that the injured employee be intoxicated at the time of the accident, and second, that the intoxication itself be a “proximate cause” of the accident.

It is important to note that the use of alcohol and cocaine leading up to the accident was never in question in this case. In order for the use of drugs to preclude coverage, they must be the actual cause of the loss, and not just incidental to the injury. In this case, as the Board, the Commission and the Alaska Supreme Court found, the supports for Adams’ ladder would have been faulty whether Adams had shown up buzzed or sober.

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