Reshaping industry: Lessons learned from deadly Surfside collapse
While nothing can replace the lives lost in this historic tragedy, there are valuable lessons to be learned across the construction industry to prevent future structural failures and loss of life in sea-side and coastal buildings across the country.
June 24, 2022, marked the one-year anniversary of the Champlain Towers South collapse—a 12-story, 136-unit condominium building in Surfside, Florida—tragically killing 98 people in what was the single deadliest structural failure not caused by terrorism in American history. While nothing can replace the lives lost in this historic tragedy, there are valuable lessons to be learned across the construction industry to prevent future structural failures and loss of life in sea-side and coastal buildings across the country.
Potential causes of the collapse
The exact cause of the collapse of the tower is still unknown. Numerous theories have been posited and are actively being investigated. Among the many reasons believed to have caused the collapse is long-term degradation of structural support in the basement-level parking garage due to water penetration and corrosion of steel. Like many seaside properties, the Champlain Towers South was subjected to the naturally occurring elements of a marine environment. The building endured prior tidal flooding events and sea water containing salt and other corrosive minerals. This unforgiving environment is suspected of playing a role in the building’s structural failure. Barrier island erosion is another potential environmental factor, which may have affected the tower. The city of Surfside is located on a barrier island, which is exposed to forceful wind and water from hurricanes and tropical storms. Coastal erosion may have weakened the building’s structure.
Another theory believed to have contributed to the collapse, as alleged in a class-action lawsuit brought by the victims’ families, is that the tower was destabilized by improper pile-driving, excavation and construction at a neighboring 18-story condominium building, causing structural failures to an already weakened building.
Still others have attributed the collapse to questionable construction practices on the Champlain Towers building itself, including improper design and poor construction at the time the towers were built. Significant underfunding, and inadequately performed maintenance and repairs by the condominium association also may have allowed the building to fall into a state of decay, making it more vulnerable to external environmental conditions. Ultimately, it is likely this horrible tragedy was caused by not one, but a conjoining of multiple factors.
In June 2022, a Miami-Dade circuit judge approved a $1.02 billion settlement for the families of the victims who died in the tower collapse. The money from the settlement will come from owners of the next-door luxury-condominium building, as well as insurance and engineering companies involved in that buildings construction. While the settlement figure seems large, no monetary compensation can ever make these families whole.
The zone of responsibility
The likelihood of so many contributing factors casts a wide zone of responsibility in the aftermath of the tower’s collapse. Some individuals and entities that could or have already been held legally or financially responsible for the collapse include the owner, developer, contractors, and design professionals/engineering firms of the adjacent condominium building, as well as the developers and contractors who constructed the Champlain Towers South building itself. The tower’s condominium association board of directors is also within the potential zone of responsibility. A condominium association board owes a fiduciary duty to the owners, and is required to exercise competent oversight of the association and its property. One class-action lawsuit alleged the board knew or should have known that the towers required major repairs based on reports that there were structural issues that needed to be addressed, but failed to act to secure the funding and resources to perform the repairs.
The class-action lawsuit alleges, among other things, that the board did not have adequate safety measures in place and failed to monitor the building activities and take available steps to prevent the catastrophe. A less obvious entity within the zone of responsibility is the law firm who acted as Champlain Towers South’s adviser and general counsel. After facing allegations that it was warned of the buildings structural problems and improperly disregarded the findings of two engineers’ reports, the Florida law firm who represented the condo association recently settled with victim’s families for approximately $31 million.
Lessons learned and future recommendations
While it is clear that several actors face exposure to liability from the tower collapse, it is important to identify specific steps to prevent a future collapse.
One potential safe guard is for state or local governments to impose more robust monitoring requirements of adjacent construction sites by neighboring property owners and developers. Such monitoring requirements could take the form of frequent inspections by local building officials, mandatory logs tracking when a construction site experiences excessive vibrations, and heightened design requirements taking into account the impact construction will have on surrounding buildings and properties. Developers should also be required to provide an initial assessment of how construction activity will be completed to avoid adverse impacts on neighboring structures.
Similarly, more frequent and extensive inspection and recertification requirements imposed on the condo association and owners of a building could ensure structural deficiencies are timely discovered and corrected. Florida lawmakers are taking steps in the right direction regarding inspection and recertification. At the time of the collapse, inspection and recertification for condominium buildings in Miami-Dade County, like the Champlain Towers South, was required only once every 40 years. Under the new Florida law, condominium buildings over three stories tall will now require recertification after 30 years, or 25 years if the building is within 3 miles of the coast, and every 10 years thereafter.
Florida’s recertification law may serve as an example for other states with sea-side properties who currently have insufficient or outdated recertification processes. Still, the question remains, are the inspection and recertification intervals set forth in the new Florida law frequent enough to prevent future structural failures in seaside buildings? Particularly for buildings in close proximity to a coast, 10-year inspection intervals may prove to be too long. Instead, states should consider requiring interim inspection and reporting requirements every five years to confirm a building is not manifesting signs of stress, followed by a more detailed and robust structural engineering certification every 10 years. While frequent inspection requirements may impose a burden on the property owners and condo associations, the ultimate goal is to provide for timely monitoring of coastal structures.
Another consideration moving forward is to raise the required amount of reserves condominium associations must maintain to complete necessary maintenance and structural repairs. This figure could be based on the number of units in the building so it remains proportionate to the association’s needs and capabilities. The Champlain Towers South board proved to have inadequate reserves to address the structural issues that needed repair.
Similarly, associations should have mechanisms and procedures for handling construction and maintenance directly built into their bylaws. Statutory frameworks should require boards to make necessary repairs within a reasonable period of time for conditions that affect public safety.
The Champlain Towers South collapse and subsequent lawsuits also serves as a wakeup call to the legal profession advising condo associations. The lawsuits highlight the potential risks of representing condominium associations and raises questions about the scope of an attorney’s obligations to its clients and others.
Finally, builders should consider a peer review process during the initial design and construction phase for certain projects constructed in a marine or coastal environment. Such a process would enhance safety by ensuring a buildings design and construction is vetted by multiple designers and engineers. Coastal developers need to start building with a focus and understanding of sea level rise, and design buildings to maintain their structural integrity while existing in a unique marine and coastal environment.
Conclusion
The Champlain Towers South collapse was a dark day in American history from which we should learn certain lessons to prevent similar future tragedies. It is important that substantial steps be taken to prevent a repeat of this tragedy. In one form or another, we all share responsibility for assuring that the buildings we construct are safe for occupancy and use.
Ralf R. Rodriguez is a member of Cozen O’Connor’s construction law practice resident in the firm’s Miami office. Contact Rodriguez at ralfrodriguez@cozen.com.
Alexander B. Thompson is an associate in the firm’s construction law practice resident in the firm’s Philadelphia office. Contact Thompson at athompson@cozen.com.