Non-driver can be sued for punitive damages in DUI wreck, court says
The justices ruled that an intoxicated man who loaned his car to a drinking buddy could also be targeted for punitive damages as an 'active tortfeasor.'
Someone who helped cause a drunk-driving accident but was not the DUI driver could still be considered an “active tortfeasor” liable for uncapped punitive damages, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled.
The unanimous decision by Justice Michael Boggs held that whether someone is an “active” or “passive” tortfeasor is a question for the jury or factfinder. Justice Charles Bethel issued a concurrence, urging the Legislature to “consider whether our interpretation of [statutory] language is, in fact, the desired law of Georgia.”
While the case at hand involved a man who had been drinking and loaned his car to his drinking buddy, one of the lawyers who argued the plaintiff’s case said it changes the legal landscape for third-party negligence, dram shop and “plenty of other tort cases in Georgia.”
“The question before was whether somebody who serves somebody — a restaurant, bartender, even a social host — who obviously shouldn’t be driving is also liable for uncapped punitive damages,” said Summerville Firm principal Darren Summerville.
“Those cases went away with this decision,” he said, adding that a jury will decide if somebody who acts with culpable liability should be on the hook. “The opinion is clear that it doesn’t have to be the drunk driver, but anyone who is impaired.”
Neither of the defendants in the case was represented by counsel, and the Supreme Court also requested briefs and arguments from the office of Attorney General Chris Carr and the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association.
As detailed in the opinion and briefs, the case began in 2016 when Keith Stroud and Lakenin Morris were drinking in Griffin one afternoon.
“Stroud asked Morris to drive his car and gave him the keys even though Morris was obviously drunk and Stroud knew that Morris was drunk, did not have a valid driver’s license, and had a habit of recklessness,” Boggs’ opinion said.
Morris, who would later plead guilty to DUI, hit a car driven by Alonzo Reid.
Reid sued Morris for negligence and Stroud for negligent entrustment in Spalding County State Court, “and both were found liable for Reid’s injuries (Morris by default and Stroud by summary judgment),” Boggs wrote.
Case analysis
Following a bench trial, Judge Josh Thacker awarded more than $23,000 in compensatory damages, which he apportioned equally between the defendants.
Thacker also found that they had “acted in a manner that showed willful misconduct, malice, wantonness, and that ‘entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences,’” justifying punitive damages.
The judge ordered the driver, Morris, to pay $50,000 in punitive damages, the exact amount that Reid requested.
In the decision leading to the high court case, the judge declined Reid’s request for $100,000 in punitive damages against Stroud, despite finding that Stroud had acted while under the influence “and engaged in conduct susceptible to punitive damages.”
Thacker based his decision on the Georgia Court of Appeals’ 2007 ruling in Capp v. Carlito’s Mexican Bar & Grill, and 2017’s Corrugated Replacements Inc. v. Johnson.
Thacker understood those decisions to hold that the punitive damages statute’s definition of “active tortfeasor” referred to “the DUI driver and this is the only person the statute authorizes an award of punitive damages against.”
Reid argued that such an interpretation violated the Georgia Constitution’s guarantee that the “right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate,” but Thacker rejected that challenge. Reid appealed.
In reversing Thacker, Boggs laid out the legislative background of Georgia’s apportionment statute and punitive damages regime, noting that 1987’s tort reform law capped some punitive damages at $250,000, while others including those arising from product liability claims were left uncapped.
But there was no limit on cases in which a defendant was found to have acted, or failed to act, “with the specific intent to cause harm,” he noted.
In this case, he said, “the question is not whether [Stroud] was the DUI driver (or even whether a DUI driver was involved in the case). The question is whether the defendant was intoxicated to the degree that his judgment was substantially impaired and whether his conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”
While precedent held that the DUI driver alone is the “active tort-feasor,” said Boggs, “there is no such categorical rule,” and to the extent other cases suggest otherwise, “they are hereby disapproved.”
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