This argument was upheld in the Komalestewa opinion and the dissent in the Grammatico case, but the state's high court concluded that doing so could effectively render the no-fault system moot by introducing the issue of fault in claims.

"Moreover, if we agreed with the Grammatico dissent and Komalestewa opinion, the legislature could circumvent Article 18, Section 8 by defining 'a necessary risk or danger' to exclude a variety of injuries if caused in part by an employee's reckless or even negligent acts," said the court.

The opinion written by Justice Michael D. Ryan noted that, "The legislature, for example, could preclude recovery for injured employees whose injuries were caused, in part, by talking on cell phones while driving, by taking cold medication, or even by being tired on the job.

"However, the language of Article 18, Section 8 and the history behind it prohibit the legislature from enacting legislation that injects fault into the workers' compensation system."

The court acknowledged that, "compelling policy reasons support banning drug and alcohol use in the workplace," adding that legislation has been passed to allow employers to take action should an employee fail a drug test.

However, the court noted that the state constitution was clear on the workers' comp case, quoting the lower court's majority ruling in the Grammatico case.

The justices upheld the premise stated in a lower court decision that, "We cannot ignore that our constitutional system for workers' compensation requires the payment of benefits if a necessary risk or danger of employment partially caused or contributed to an industrial accident, without consideration of any fault by the injured employee."

"Thus, unless and until the constitution is changed, the legislature cannot abrogate claims for workers' compensation for injuries wholly or partially caused or contributed to by necessary employment risks or dangers solely because an employee fails to pass . . . a drug or alcohol test."