In a case which the plaintiffs argued was a matter of first impression, the court ruled that regardless of a pet's status as an emotional support animal, they are still viewed as property in the eyes of the state.

The plaintiffs, Kaitlyn and Kevin Flynn, originally filed a complaint against BluePearl Specialty Emergency Pet Hospital, Dr. Kent Vince, Woodinville Animal Hospital (WAH), and Dr. Nichole Frei-Johnson, after their pet and Kevin Flynn's emotional support dog died from septic shock. Prior to the dog's death, the Flynns repeatedly sought care from WAH, fearing the dog had a bladder infection. Three weeks after the initially brought the dog WAH, and after repeated visits and calls, WAH instructed the plaintiffs to bring the dog BluePearl, as they feared her bladder had ruptured.

According to the court, "Clementine underwent emergency surgery at BluePearl to repair her bladder. While recovering from surgery at BluePearl, Clementine went into septic shock. Clementine died the next morning. Following Clementine's death, Kevin experienced insomnia, inability to focus, and depression. He sought care from his psychiatrist who increased his medication dosages."

The series of events lead the plaintiffs to bring the two charges of NIED and corporate/professional negligence against the four parties, with BluePearl and Vince moving for partial summary judgment, alleging that the corporate negligence doctrine only applied to full-service hospitals that treat humans, and that NIED damages cannot be award for claims stemming from the negligent death or injury of a pet.

While the trial court dismissed the claims against the two defendants, and against WAH and Frei-Johnson on the same basis, it did so while preserving the Flynn's right to appeal.

On appeal the Flynn's reasserted their claims of NIED and corporate/professional negligence, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing them.

In terms of the plaintiffs' corporate negligence claims, the court ruled that such claims do not apply to dogs, as pets are classified as property in Washington and the medical malpractice act only applies to human health care, excluding veterinarians and veterinary clinics.

"The doctrine of corporate negligence is based on a nondelegable duty that a hospital owes directly to its patients," said the court. "While it may be true that society expects animal hospitals to care for animals similarly to how human hospitals provide care for humans, it is well established that animals are treated differently than humans under Washington law. Notably, our Supreme Court has just recently reiterated that pets, as a matter of law, are considered personal property."

To support this analysis, the court cited the ruling in Sherman v. Kissinger, where the court had ruled the medical malpractice statute Chapter 7.70 RCW only applied to human health care and not to veterinarians or veterinary clinics.

The Flynns requested for the court to disregard Sherman, "arguing that because the claim of corporate negligence is borne out of common law, the fact that Chapter 7.70 RCW does not apply to veterinarians and veterinary hospitals does not matter in the instant case."

However, the court used Pedroza to establish that corporate negligence had only ever been applied to hospitals that treated humans. The Flynns cited numerous cases in an attempt to support their argument, but none of them changed the fact that Washington treats animals as property under the law.

Legislature also supported this view, leading the court to conclude the trial court hadn't erred in dismissing the claims of corporate negligence.

Similarly, the court denied the plaintiffs' claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiffs' dog was considered property in the state, regardless of the close emotional connection they shared with the animal.

The court sided multiple cases to support their stance, including Pickford, where the "court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for NIED or damages for loss of companionship and the human-animal relationship for the negligent death or injury of a pet," and Hendrickson where "the court rejected a dog owner's request for emotional damages under a breach of contract claim when the dog died following treatment by an animal hospital."

The ruling in the criminal case State v. Abdi-Issa also supported the court's assertion that pets were considered personal property, as a matter of law.

The Flynns contended the issue was a matter of first impression, as the their dog wasn't simply a pet, but an emotional support animal. Thus, according to the plaintiffs, "emotional distress negligently inflicted because of her death rises above claims of emotional distress from the deaths of ordinary pets."

This was not a matter of importance to the court.

"However, the gravamen is not the degree of the emotional connection between the owner and its animal, but the fact that animals, whether they are pets or emotional support animals, are still considered property—even when there is a profound emotional connection," concluded the court.

"While appreciative of the attention given to the issues of deep importance to Washingtonians—i.e., whether veterinary hospitals and clinics owe a duty of care to their clients and nonhuman patients; and whether veterinarians should be liable for mental anguish inflicted upon their clients when they negligently maim or kill their animals (including assistance animals)—the Court of Appeals failed to align the common law to social realities pursuant to statutory mandate and judicial expectation," said attorney for the plaintiffs, Adam P. Karp, Animal Law Offices, in Bellingham, Washington. "I remain optimistic that the Washington Supreme Court will accept review of these vital issues, which is the next step my clients intend to take in this case."

Attorney for the defendants, Johnson and Woodinville—Marilee C. Erickson of Reed McClure, in Seattle—and attorney for defendants, BluePearl and Vince—Andrew Harry Gustafson of Lee Smart, in Seattle—were not immediately reached for comment.