The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida has denied an insured's motion for reconsideration in a dispute over its claim for damages its golf course suffered as a result of Hurricane Irma.

The Case

After its country club property in Naples, Florida, was damaged by Hurricane Irma, Grey Oaks Country Club, Inc., submitted a claim to its insurer, Zurich American Insurance Company.

Grey Oaks subsequently sued Zurich, alleging that Zurich had breached its coverage obligations under the commercial insurance policy by failing to compensate Grey Oaks for the full amount of its damages and loss resulting from Hurricane Irma.

The parties cross moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, asking the court to favor their interpretation of the limits of coverage for "Golf Course Outdoor Grounds" available under the policy, which turned on the determination of what the word "premises" meant under the endorsement.

Grey Oaks argued that the policy contained a "Schedule of Locations" that specifically listed 19 locations, thereby producing up to $9,500,000 of available coverage for the club's outdoor damages due to Hurricane Irma.

For its part, Zurich asserted that there was only one "premises."

The court held that the definition of "premises" in the policy was unambiguous and that there were two "premises" for purposes of the Golf Course Outdoor Grounds Coverage: 2400 Grey Oaks Drive North and 1600 Estuary Drive.

The court then denied Grey Oaks' motion and granted Zurich's motion to the extent that it limited the premises to the two addresses subject to the policy's $500,000 per premises limit of liability in the Golf Course Outdoor Grounds Coverage insuring agreement.

Grey Oaks moved for reconsideration, contending that the court had committed clear error under Florida law that needed to be corrected to prevent manifest injustice.

In support of that argument, Grey Oaks first argued that, after rejecting Zurich's interpretation of the policy as unreasonable, the court should have deemed the policy ambiguous and construed it in Grey Oaks' favor.

Second, it contended that the court erred when it refused to give any meaning to the Schedule of Locations within the property coverage section even though the policy's plain language made clear that this schedule applied to the entire policy.

Third, it asserted that the court improperly declined to apply the Schedule of Locations because Grey Oaks did not cite any legal authority for the proposition that a policy's "Common Policy Forms and Endorsements" must be applied to all coverage sections.

The District Court's Decision

The court denied Grey Oaks' motion.

In its decision, the court first explained that it had decided that the policy was "unambiguous" and, therefore, that it did not have to interpret it against RSUI and in favor of Grey Oaks.

The court also rejected Grey Oaks' arguments that the court had erred in its conclusion that the Schedule of Locations had to be specifically referenced within the commercial property coverage part to be applicable as the Schedule of Locations was the only part of the policy where there were any locations scheduled as referenced in the definition of "premises," and that the court also had erred in its refusal to interpret the Schedule of Locations within the property coverage because Grey Oaks had not cited any authority for the proposition that the common policy forms and endorsements applied to all of the coverage sections. According to the court, Grey Oaks "merely reiterate[ed] its arguments and interpretation" of the policy language that the court had already considered in its prior opinion; therefore, it denied its motion for reconsideration.

The court concluded by rejecting Grey Oaks' request that it certify the following two questions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit:

(1) Whether a Schedule of Locations, which is incorporated as a common form and endorsement in a policy with multiple coverages, must be given meaning and effect to determine the number of insured premises for a coverage subsection that does not specifically provide a schedule of premises or locations.

(2) When a dispute arises between a policyholder and an insurer regarding the meaning of a policy provision and the court rejects the insurer's interpretation as unreasonable, may a court forego the broader interpretation offered by the policyholder in favor of its own narrower interpretation of the policy.

The court found that these issues failed to satisfy the standard for certifying questions to the circuit court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

The case is Grey Oaks Country Club, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., No: 2:18-cv-639-FtM-99NPM (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2019). Attorneys involved include: For Grey Oaks Country Club, Inc., Plaintiff: Cary David Steklof, Michael John Mueller, LEAD ATTORNEY, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Miami, FL; Walter Joseph Andrews, LEAD ATTORNEY, Hunton & Williams, LLP, McLean, VA. For Zurich American Insurance Company, Defendant: Ira S. Bergman, Jason M. Chodos, LEAD ATTORNEY, Litchfield Cavo, LLP, Ft Lauderdale, FL.

Steven A. Meyerowitz

Steven A. Meyerowitz

Steven A. Meyerowitz, a Harvard Law School graduate, is the founder and president of Meyerowitz Communications Inc., a law firm marketing communications consulting company. He may be contacted at [email protected].

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