Blue Cross Blue Shield (“BCBS”) provided evidence that it had paid an additional $27,501.86 for the medical treatment of the injured individual under the injured individual's insurance policy.

The trial court found that N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08 and N.D. Const. art. I, § 25 could be harmonized and applied N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08 to order restitution in favor of BCBS in the amount of $30,734.93 – $3,233.07 for the conceded out-of-pocket costs plus the $27,501.86 claimed by BCBS.

The dispute reached the Supreme Court of North Dakota. There, Hunt argued that BCBS was precluded from recovery of its expenditures in the criminal proceedings because the definition of “victim” under N.D. Const. art. I, § 25 was incompatible with a recovery by a corporation under the criminal restitution statute, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08(1).

North Dakota Law

Article I, § 25(4), of the North Dakota constitution provides:

As used in this section, a “victim” is a person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act or against whom the crime or delinquent act is committed. If a victim is deceased, incompetent, incapacitated, or a minor, the victim's spouse, parent, grandparent, child, sibling, grandchild, or guardian, and any person with a relationship to the victim that is substantially similar to a listed relationship, may also exercise these rights. The term “victim” does not include the accused or a person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a deceased, incompetent, minor, or incapacitated victim.

Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08(1), when sentencing an individual convicted of a crime that resulted in monetary damage, the trial court:

shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victim or other recipient as determined by the court . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

The North Dakota Supreme Court's Decision

The court affirmed.

In its decision, the court observed that it previously had determined that insurance companies fell within the definition of “other recipient” under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08(1).

The court then pointed out that the stated purpose of N.D. Const. art. I, § 25 was to “preserve and protect the right of crime victims.” The court reasoned that although N.D. Const. art. I, § 25(4) granted certain rights to those who met its definition of “victim,” it contained no directive that would prevent the legislature from expanding the statutory reach of restitution beyond the scope of N.D. Const. art. I, § 25.

The court declared that it did not have to determine whether the definition of a victim under N.D. Const. art. I, § 25 was limited to individuals because, even if it determined that the definition of victim contained within N.D. Const. art. I, § 25 was limited to individuals, that definition did not conflict with the legislature's expansion of restitution provided within N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08 to “other recipient[s].” Accordingly, it concluded that the trial court had not erred when it harmonized N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08 and N.D. Const. art. I, § 25 in awarding restitution to BCBS.

The case is State v. Hunt, No. 20180423 (N.D. May 16, 2019). Attorneys involved include: Tessa M. Vaagen, Assistant State's Attorney, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellee. Yancy B. Cottrill, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant.