A federal district court in Texas has denied a man's summary judgment motion in an interpleader action brought by a life insurer, finding that there was an issue of material fact as to his involvement in his wife's death.
The Case
After Tuyet Tran was killed, Reliastar Life Insurance Company, which had issued a life insurance policy on her life, deposited the proceeds of the policy into the registry of a federal district court in Texas. The insurer asked the district court to decide whether the policy's primary beneficiary (Ms. Tran's husband, Trang Vu, now known as Itani Milleni) or whether the policy's contingent beneficiaries (Ms. Tran's children) were entitled to the policy proceeds.
Reliastar instituted the action because there were indications that Vu was suspected of murdering Ms. Tran, which, if true, would disqualify him from receiving the insurance policy proceeds under Texas law.
Vu, who had not been prosecuted criminally for Ms. Tran's death, moved for summary judgment, contending that the children could not raise an issue of material fact as to his involvement in Ms. Tran's death.
The District Court's Decision
The district court denied Vu's motion.
In its decision, the district court explained that the basic question in the action was whether Vu was a principal or an accomplice in bringing about Ms. Tran's death.
The district court pointed out that the burden of proof on the issue was on the children “to prove this issue by a preponderance of the evidence.” The district court added that a criminal conviction was not a prerequisite.
The district court conceded that Vu was “factually correct” that the children had no direct evidence (such as an eye witness) linking him to their mother's death. The district court said, however, that “direct evidence” was “not required.” In fact, the district court continued, “circumstantial evidence” could be “the sole basis for a judgment that a potential beneficiary killed the insured and consequently [was] not entitled to life insurance proceeds.” It added that at the summary judgment stage, the children only needed to raise an issue of material fact for the case to continue.
The district court then stated that the summary judgment evidence established that Vu “perhaps intended to harm [Ms. Tran] based upon his years of physical and verbal abuse. This abuse included instances at Vu's own hand and evidence that he used objects such as furniture and belts. These instances of abuse could be triggered by minor events including improperly cooked foods or [Ms. Tran's] failure to follow Vu's instructions.”
In the district court's opinion, the evidence supported the allegation that Vu did “these acts of abuse” both in the privacy of their home and also in public places, such as Ms. Tran's salon. “These acts also occurred in front of family members and non-family members alike,” according to the district court.
The district court noted that “[m]uch of this evidence” came from Vu himself, observing that he “admitted on camera that one of his mistakes was 'taking care of my business [abusing Ms. Tran]' in front of witnesses.”
These incidents, the district court said, “led to divorce proceedings, police intervention, and [the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“TDFPS”)] taking custody of the minor [children].”
The district court also observed that, eventually, Ms. Tran separated from Vu and sought a restraining order.
The district court added that, on the morning of July 20, 2015, Tequelia Armstrong, a new caseworker at TDFPS, contacted both Vu and Ms. Tran to set up interviews; that Ms. Tran agreed to meet with Ms. Armstrong at her salon the following day; that Vu met with Ms. Armstrong at 3:00 p.m. on July 20; and that, according to Ms. Armstrong, the meeting with Vu started calmly but escalated to the point that Vu left angry and upset.
The district court added that the summary judgment evidence indicated that Vu left that meeting, went home, and then went to Ms. Tran's salon – allegedly arriving at 6:00 p.m., when several students and instructors still were present.
According to the district court, Vu claimed that:
- The students left and that an unidentified African American male walked into the salon and left without saying a word;
- Vu then went to his car, where he kept a gun and small ax, retrieved his gun, and returned to help those remaining at the salon close up for the night;
- Eventually only Vu and Ms. Tran were left in the salon;
- Vu stayed about 15 minutes and left;
- At the time Vu left he saw the same African American male along with others lingering in the parking lot; and
- He left to buy flowers for Ms. Tran (but he admitted that he arrived home much later and without flowers).
That night, the district court said, Ms. Tran died of blunt force trauma to the head. It added that Ms. Tran:
was found the next morning, July 21st, dead in her salon. She had been hit with an object which is consistent with the ax owned by Vu. After her death this ax – which Vu normally kept in his car – was lost. The time of death was estimated to be 8:41 p.m. Vu was by his own admission the last person known to have seen her alive.
The district court also noted that the crime scene revealed that Ms. Tran's cell phone was broken and trashed, her credit cards were in plain sight but had not been taken, she had cash sticking out of her pocket, there was no forced entry into the cash register, and her car was found within walking distance of the shop with a window broken and the key in the ignition.
Therefore, the district court denied Vu's motion for summary judgment based on the contention that there was no evidence that he was involved in his wife's murder. It concluded that, “The above fact scenario, if proven, could be the basis of a reasonable jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Vu was the perpetrator of [Ms. Tran's] death.”
The case is Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v. Milleni, No. 4:17-CV-02818 (S.D. Tex. March 11, 2019). Attorneys involved include: For Reliastar Life Insurance Company, Plaintiff: Jason Anthony Richardson, McDowell Hetherington LLP, Houston, TX. For P.T., A Minor, D.T., A Minor, Plaintiffs, Cross Claimants: John William Belk, LEAD ATTORNEY, John William Belk & Associates LLC, Houston, TX; Megan Charlotte Moore, LEAD ATTORNEY, APPOINTED AD LITEM, Rusty Hardin & Associates, LLP, Houston, TX. For Itani Milleni, formerly known as, Trang Vu, Defendant, Cross Defendant: Casey Michael Brown, LEAD ATTORNEY, The Callahan Law Firm, Houston, TX.


