The insurance company, Erie Insurance Exchange, denied the claim, finding that Mr. Harris was not entitled to coverage under the policy.

The estate brought suit.

Erie moved for summary judgment, arguing, as a matter of law, that the policy did not provide uninsured motorist bodily injury coverage to the estate for Mr. Harris' death because he did not qualify as “others we protect.”

The estate countered with a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, as a matter of law, that Mr. Harris “qualified as 'others we protect' under the 'OUR PROMISE' section” of the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage endorsement (the “UM Endorsement”) when he was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist because he was a listed driver of the vehicle covered by the Erie policy.

The trial court determined that the case turned on whether the phrase “others we protect” as used in the “OUR PROMISE” section included Mr. Harris. The trial court found the phrase ambiguous and construed it in the estate's favor to include Mr. Harris.

Erie appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court of appeals found “others we protect” ambiguous and construed it in the estate's favor to include Mr. Harris.

The dispute reached the Indiana Supreme Court.

There, Erie insisted that “others we protect” carried the meaning outlined in the OTHERS WE PROTECT section directly beneath the section of the policy that contained the “others we protect” language, therefore making the phrase unambiguous and impervious to judicial construction.

On the other hand, the estate reasoned that “others we protect” included “individuals such as Mr. Harris who were specifically listed in the Erie [p]olicy for purposes of protection and coverage.”

The Erie Policy

The uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage endorsement (the “UM Endorsement”) provided: 

OUR PROMISE

We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage that the law entitles you or your legal representative to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle . . . . Damages must result from a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership or use of the uninsured motor vehicle . . . as a motor vehicle and involve . . . bodily injury to you or others we protect. 

Just underneath this provision was a section that stated:

OTHERS WE PROTECT

1. Any relative, if you are an individual.

2. Anyone else, while occupying any owned auto we insure other than one being used without the permission of the owner.

3. Anyone else who is entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury to any person protected by this coverage.

4. If you are an individual, anyone else while occupying a non-owned auto we insure other than:

a. [O]ne you are using that is owned by another resident of your household.

b. [O]ne furnished or available for the regular use of you and any resident of your household.

c. [O]ne being operated by anyone other than you or a relative. 

The Indiana court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Erie.

In its decision, the court noted that Mr. Harris did not qualify as “you” under the policy because that meant his employer.

The court then considered whether Mr. Harris qualified as “others we protect” in the policy's UM Endorsement, and ruled that he did not.

The court decided that the policy term “others we protect” was susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, so it was not ambiguous and not subject to judicial construction.

It said that the estate's proposed interpretation appeared initially to be a reasonable one, but that it was “not reasonable” because it required “OTHERS WE PROTECT to mean something different from 'others we protect.'” The court added that the estate's interpretation depended on the premise that the separate OTHERS WE PROTECT section could not and did not define the phrase “others we protect” in the OUR PROMISE section because “others we protect” did not meet the criteria for defined terms – it was not bolded and did not appear in a DEFINITIONS section. The court reasoned that the estate's interpretation, therefore, imputed “a separate meaning to OTHERS WE PROTECT,” specifically that the separate section identified remote claimants who might be entitled to uninsured motorist bodily injury benefits even though they were neither “you” (that is, Mr. Harris' employer) nor “others we protect” (that is, listed drivers such as Mr. Harris).

The court ruled that it was reasonable to conclude that OTHERS WE PROTECT gave meaning to “others we protect.” The court noted that the phrase “others we protect” appeared only once in the UM Endorsement and immediately was followed by a section titled with the same three words: OTHERS WE PROTECT. The court said that it was “eminently reasonable for two phrases consisting of identical words and located near one another to share the same meaning.” The court acknowledged that it was not a “definition” per se, but said that the proximity and similarity between the phrases made it “reasonable to understand” that the OTHERS WE PROTECT section served as an explanatory list outlining who could be included in “others we protect.” In other words, the court found, the section gave meaning to the corresponding phrase.

The court said that Erie “could have (and probably should have) removed any doubt as to the phrase's meaning by making 'others we protect' a defined term rather than a standalone section.” The court nevertheless ruled that, “Erie's drafting miscues notwithstanding,” it was “obvious” that OTHERS WE PROTECT gave meaning to “others we protect.” Moreover, the court said, “ordinary policyholders,” looking at the four corners of the policy, would agree that “others we protect” meant OTHERS WE PROTECT.

The court then found the estate's proposed interpretation for “others we protect” unreasonable. The court explained that nothing in the policy language indicated that “others we protect” transformed a listed driver into an insured or a person covered or protected under the UM Endorsement. The court added that the estate's interpretation created “no fewer than three categories of claimants” who could obtain uninsured motorist bodily injury benefits under the UM Endorsement: “you,” “others we protect,” and “OTHERS WE PROTECT.” In the court's view, an ordinary policyholder would likely see the estate's interpretation as injecting “needless conflict and confusion into the policy concerning two closely related if not identical terms.”

Accordingly, the court concluded that the estate was not entitled to uninsured motorist bodily injury benefits under the UM Endorsement.

The case is Erie Indemnity Co. v. Estate of Harris, No. 18S-CT-114 (Ind. June 19, 2018). Attorneys involved include: FOR APPELLANT: Mark R. Smith Smith Fisher Maas Howard & Lloyd, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana. FOR APPELLEES: Scott M. Keller Michael J. Anderson Tracey S. Schafer Anderson, Agostino & Keller, P.C. South Bend, Indiana. FOR AMICUS CURIAE INSURANCE INSTITUTE OF INDIANA, INC.: Bryan H. Babb Bose McKinney & Evans LLP Indianapolis, Indiana.