While Huguely was appealing his conviction, Ms. Love's mother filed a multi-count wrongful death action against him. Her complaint contained four counts, all sounding in negligence.

Chartis Property Casualty Company initially provided a defense for Huguely under homeowners and excess liability insurance policies it had issued to his mother and stepfather. Chartis subsequently determined that a coverage exclusion in both policies entitled it to deny providing Huguely with either indemnification or a defense.

It then filed a declaratory judgment action for a determination that it had no obligation either to indemnify or defend Huguely.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, relying on the exclusion for “any criminal act” in both Chartis insurance policies, concluded that Chartis had no obligation either to indemnify or defend Huguely.

The coverage dispute reached the Fourth Circuit.

There, Chartis argued that because all the factual allegations in the wrongful death action involved conduct that had been adjudicated as criminal, it had no obligation to either indemnify or defend Huguely.

Ms. Love's mother's primary argument was that the exclusions for a “criminal act” had to be limited to intentional criminal acts because the exclusion in each insurance policy appeared under the “Intentional Acts” or “Intentional Act” heading. She then argued that despite Huguely's conviction for second degree murder, whether Huguely could have intended to harm Ms. Love was a highly contested fact given evidence of his extreme intoxication, and that summary judgment under these circumstances was inappropriate.

She also relied on a statement in Young v. Brown, 658 So.2d 750, 754 (La. Ct.App. 1995) that “[t]he term 'criminal acts,' as used in the coverage exclusion is susceptible of more than one meaning” and that an exclusion for “the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person” required the criminal act to be intentional.

The Chartis Policies

Chartis' homeowners' insurance policy excluded coverage for:

[p]ersonal injury . . . resulting from any criminal, willful, intentional or malicious act or omission. 

Its excess liability insurance policy similarly excluded coverage for:

any criminal, willful, fraudulent, dishonest, intentional or malicious act. 

The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

In its decision, the circuit court observed that the district court had concluded that treating the heading of the exclusion provisions as part of the exclusion created ambiguity by barring coverage for an “Intentional Act [a]rising out of any . . . intentional . . . act.” The circuit court noted that the district court found that the proper reading of the exclusions required reading the prefatory language before the list of exclusions and omitting the title, so that the exclusion read: “This policy does not provide coverage for liability, defense costs or any other cost or expense for: personal injury . . . resulting from any criminal, willful, intentional or malicious act. . . .”

The circuit court also noted that the district court had rejected the Louisiana authority on which Ms. Love's mother relied, pointing out that Maryland and other authorities had explicitly rejected Young's approach, instead holding that “clauses that cover both intentional and criminal acts like the ones here do not require intent for criminal acts.”

For the reasons stated by the district court, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The circuit court concluded that the “unambiguous language in the exclusions” in the Chartis homeowners' insurance policy for personal injuries “resulting from any criminal” act and in its excess liability policy for injuries “arising out of any criminal” act entitled Chartis to summary judgment and a declaration that it was not required either to indemnify Huguely or provide him with a defense in the wrongful death action brought by Ms. Love's mother.

The case is Love v. Chartis Property Casualty Co., No. 17-1467 (4th Cir. May 15, 2018). Attorneys involved include: ARGUED: Paul David Bekman, BEKMAN, MARDER & ADKINS, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Stacey Ann Moffet, ECCLESTON AND WOLF, P.C., Hanover, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Emily C. Malarkey, BEKMAN, MARDER & ADKINS, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Richard J. Berwanger, Jr., ECCLESTON AND WOLF, P.C., Hanover, Maryland, for Appellee.