Topics covered:

Evolution of the exclusions

Current definitions

Current exclusions

Negligent entrustment and negligent supervision

Maintenance, occupancy, use, or operation of a motor vehicle

Severability of interests versus motor vehicle exclusion

Exceptions to the motor vehicle exclusion

Recreational vehicles

Dead storage

Watercraft exclusion

Aircraft and hovercraft exclusions

Exception to the motor vehicle, watercraft, and aircraft exclusions

Evolution of the Exclusions

 The ISO 1977 homeowners forms briefly stated that there was no coverage “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of: (1) an aircraft; (2) a motor vehicle owned or operated by, or rented or loaned to any insured; or (3) a watercraft: (a) owned by or rented to any insured if the watercraft has inboard or inboard-outdrive motor power of more than 50 horsepower or is a sailing vessel, with or without auxiliary power, 26 feet or more in overall length; or (b) powered by one or more outboard motors with more than 25 total horsepower, owned by any insured at the inception of this policy. If you report in writing to us within 45 days after acquisition, an intention to insure any outboard motors acquired prior to the policy period, coverage will apply.” 

 The earlier AAIS form was similar in its exclusionary scope. It should be noted that the AAIS forms are constructed somewhat differently from ISO's in that rather than stating what is not covered, they often state what is covered vis a vis motor vehicles, watercraft, and aircraft.

 The 1984 ISO homeowners edition made changes that were carried into the 1991 forms. Provisions were added that excluded entrustment by an insured and statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability. These expansions of the exclusions were a response to a minority of court cases that found coverage for negligent entrustment or statutory parental liability. Policy drafters simply made clear what was intended all along—and what the majority of courts found even with the old language: any liability resulting in any way from involvement with the types of motor vehicles, watercraft, or aircraft reached by the exclusions is not covered. The current ISO forms have refined the vicarious parental liability exclusion to exclude coverage for all types of vicarious parental liability, whether statutorily imposed or not, arising out of such claims (i.e., claims based in common law as well as statute). Further, the current provision does not use the term “parental” at all in describing what types of vicarious liability for acts of minors are excluded, so the exclusion applies to claims based on negligent entrustment by the insured to any minor.

 The ISO 2000 and 2011 forms have revised the exclusions so that certain words and terms are defined and appear in the Definitions. For example, “motor vehicle liability” is now a defined term and includes liability for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the:

 (1) Ownership of such vehicle…by an insured;

(2) Maintenance, occupancy, operation, use, loading or unloading of such vehicle or craft by any person;

(3) Entrustment of such vehicle or craft by an insured to any person;

(4) Failure to supervise or negligent supervision of any person involving such vehicle…by an insured; or

(5) Vicarious liability, whether or not imposed by law, for the actions of a child or minor involving such vehicle.

 The AAIS form 3 Ed. 2.0 eliminated coverage for “'bodily injury' or 'property damage' which results from the ownership, operation, maintenance, use, occupancy, renting, loaning, entrusting, supervision, loading, or unloading” of aircraft (except for model aircraft), motorized vehicles, trailers, or watercraft owned or operated by or rented or loaned to an insured. (There are exceptions, notably for liability to a domestic employee in the course of duties and for coverage provided by incidental liability.)  The new AAIS form, form HO 0003 09 08 includes leasing of vehicles as part of the exclusion and adds hovercraft as excluded vehicles.

 Current Definitions

 The new AAIS forms have removed two of the definitions that appeared in the Form 3 Ed 2.0; motor vehicle and recreational motor vehicle. First, a motorized vehicle means: “a self-propelled land or amphibious vehicle regardless of method of surface contact.” This does not include hovercraft, model hovercraft, watercraft, or model watercraft. Trailers or semitrailers that are attached to, being carried on or towed by, or that become detached while being carried or towed by a motorized vehicle, are considered motorized vehicles. The references to vehicles designed to assist the handicapped or vehicles not required to be licensed for road use have been removed. The policy states that hovercraft does not include model hovercraft not designed to carry people or cargo; aircraft, model aircraft not designed to carry people or cargo; motorized vehicle; watercraft, or a model watercraft not designed to carry people or cargo. The wording for the aircraft and watercraft definition is similar to that of hovercraft, with the appropriate change of terms where necessary.

 Except for the homeowners 76 policy, ISO did not define terms. (The homeowners 76 policy included a definition of motor vehicles, but since this led to some confusion with the separate motorized land vehicle exclusion of the section I personal property coverage, the definition was removed in 1982.) Motor vehicle, watercraft, and aircraft were not specifically defined terms in the 1984 or 1991 homeowners forms. Instead, they were defined by way of exceptions within the exclusions themselves.

 But with the ISO 2000 and 2011 forms, definitions for aircraft, watercraft, hovercraft, and motor vehicles were included as part of the definition of aircraft, hovercraft, motor vehicle, and watercraft liability. Now, the forms contain these definitions:

 (1) Aircraft means any contrivance used or designed for flight except model or hobby aircraft not used or designed to carry people or cargo;

(2) Hovercraft means a self-propelled motorized ground effect vehicle and includes, but is not limited to, flarecraft and air cushion vehicles;

(3) Watercraft means a craft principally designed to be propelled on or in water by wind, engine power or electric motor; and

(4) Motor vehicle means: a. a self-propelled land or amphibious vehicle; or b. any trailer or semitrailer which is being carried on, towed by or hitched for towing by a vehicle described in a. above.

Current Exclusions

 It is not the intent to reprint the current exclusionary language in this discussion. The reader is directed to see Homeowners Section II Exclusions and see Liability Coverages—AAIS Homeowners for the exclusions themselves.

 Noteworthy, though, is the fact that with the ISO 2000 program an additional set of exclusions has been added to the watercraft exclusions. This carries into the 2011 program. There is no coverage if at the time of an occurrence the watercraft is rented to others, used to carry persons or cargo for a charge, used for any business purpose, or operating in or practicing for a prearranged race or speed competition. This latter does not apply to a sailing vessel or a boat in a predicted log cruise.

 Negligent Entrustment and Negligent Supervision

 The majority of courts have ruled that even where the policy does not specifically exclude coverage for a parent's negligent entrustment, coverage for such claims is precluded by the exclusion of loss “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles.”  A case comprehensively analyzing other cases with this majority view is Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 868 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1989). In Bailey, the court noted that of the thirty-one jurisdictions that had considered the issue by 1989, twenty-eight had concluded that coverage for negligent entrustment was excluded under the “arising out of” language.

 This majority position on negligent entrustment has prompted insureds to seek coverage under allegedly non-vehicle related causes of action, most commonly, negligent supervision. The majority of courts have rejected coverage for either claim, with at least one court specifically holding that “negligent entrustment” and “negligent supervision” are almost synonymous and are based on the same rationale. (See Great Central Insurance Co. v. Roemmich, 291 N.W.2d 772 [S.D. 1980]). Although most courts have found that both negligent entrustment and negligent supervision fall within the scope of the exclusion and are related, a few courts have upheld coverage for claims based on negligent supervision or have distinguished the claims from each other.

 One such was the court in Columbia Mutual Ins. Co. V. Neal, 992 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Here, the insureds' two-year old grandson, who was residing with them, was killed when a vehicle they owned backed over the child. The grandparents' auto policy's limits were paid, and the child's mother brought action under the homeowners policy. The court said that under the policy under review there was no exclusion for negligent supervision, and that the use of the vehicle was incidental to the claim. Citing A.R.H. v. W.H.S., 876 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. App. 1994), the court said the obligation was to supervise and control the child, not the instrumentality that caused a harm. Moreover, although the exclusion of bodily injury to an insured was noted, the court said that facts indicated the child was not really a resident relative.

 However, for the most the exclusions have been upheld in spite of somewhat creative attempts to circumvent them. One such was Alfa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones, 555 So. 2d 77 (Ala. 1989). A minor child visiting the insureds was killed while operating the insureds' go-cart on their street. The complaints against the insureds alleged either negligent entrustment or negligent supervision. When the trial court entered judgment for the insurer, the father of the dead boy made a motion to overturn the judgment and also amended his complaint to charge only negligent supervision. The amended complaint (based solely on negligent supervision) removed any reference to the go-cart or the way in which the boy had died (in order to focus on a non-vehicle cause of action). The court found no coverage, holding that the negligent supervision theory sought “recovery for a death arising out of the ownership of a motor vehicle owned by the insureds” and thus fit squarely within the terms of the “unambiguous” exclusion.

 The case of Iorio v. Simone, 773 A.2d 722 (N. J. Super. 2001) also involved an allegation of negligent supervision. The insured owned a go-cart which he allowed his son, age twelve, to drive. The son drove the go-cart down the driveway and the insured's nephew, age nine, got in. When the son drove the go-cart into the street and crashed into a tree, the nephew was injured and his parents sued, alleging negligent supervision. They stated that the negligent supervision was the act of permitting the nephew to climb into the go-cart, and since this occurred on the insured premises, that should fall within the exception to the exclusion. (There is coverage for injury arising out of a recreational vehicle while on an insured location.) The court disagreed, stating that the trigger for liability coverage was the accident, which resulted in the bodily injury, not a type of careless conduct. 

 In another case upholding the exclusion, a court held that homeowners coverage did not apply to a father who failed to supervise his daughter as she was exiting a car. In Citizens Security Mutual Insurance Co. v. Levinson, 445 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), the father parked the car across the street from a friend's house and crossed the street with his son, leaving his daughter apparently asleep in the back seat. As they reached the other side, they heard the sound of brakes screeching and turned to find the girl lying in the street, severely and permanently injured. The driver's liability limits were exhausted when the father turned to his homeowners insurance for coverage. He argued that his daughter's injuries were caused by two independent acts of negligence, one being vehicle-related and the other (his negligent supervision of the child) was not. The court found that the daughter's injuries were “a natural and reasonable consequence of the use of the [car],” so that the father's negligence was not divisible into two concurrent acts of negligence.

 In an earlier case in the same state, Fillmore v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co., 344 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), the court had decided that “[n]egligent entrustment and supervision [were] part of the tort of negligent operation of an automobile” so that the homeowners insurer owed no coverage when these claims were brought. Claims for negligent entrustment and supervision were brought against the parents of a young man who had drug and alcohol problems, but whose parents nonetheless allowed him to use their car. In a wreck involving a police squad car, the young man, a passenger, and a police officer were killed, and two other persons were seriously injured.

 In finding that coverage did not apply, the Fillmore court referred to two previous Minnesota supreme court decisions. The first, Republic Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Buehl, 204 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 1973) was a case in which the court held that there was coverage for a claim of negligent entrustment. The Fillmore court pointed out that the Buehl decision had been reached under different policy language, in that the policy stated that “This policy does not apply:…to the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of (1) automobiles…” The Buehl decision had prompted insurers to broaden the scope of the automobile exclusion by adding the “arising out of” language. The impact of this change was recognized by the court in Faber v. Roelefs, 250 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1977), a case involving a general liability policy in which a student was run over by a school bus and a claim for negligent supervision was brought. Finding no coverage, the supreme court stated that “the exclusion does not apply merely to the use of an automobile, but to bodily injuries arising out of the use of an automobile and is thus distinguishable.” The court in Fillmore used Faber as the second case in upholding a denial of coverage.

 The exclusion was also upheld in a California case involving loading a van for a camping trip. The parents of a family getting ready for a camping trip failed to set the parking brake and to supervise a group of children (all of whom were less than four years old) who were playing near the van. While the insureds were in the house, one of their children entered the van through an open door and put the van in motion. It rolled backward and killed a neighbor's child. The court refused to accept that the failure to supervise the child in the van was an act of negligence that was independent from the use (i.e., loading) of the van. The case is National American Insurance Co. v. Coburn, 257 Cal. Rptr. 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

As several cases have done, the Coburn case distinguished the facts before it from the situation in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. S. Ct. 1973). In Partridge, the insured had filed the trigger of his gun so that it had a “hair trigger.” While hunting jackrabbits one night, he went off the road in pursuit of a rabbit. The jarring of the vehicle caused the hair trigger to go off, and his passenger was shot and paralyzed. The court reasoned that the filing of the trigger was an independent act of negligence from the vehicle-related negligence, so the insured was covered by his homeowners policy. The state supreme court reasoned that if an accident had occurred outside of the vehicle because of the hair trigger, homeowners coverage would have applied, so that negligence completely separate from the use of the vehicle was involved. The Partridge case spurred the development of a line of cases in which the insureds have argued that they are entitled to coverage based on some type of non-vehicle related negligence. The case is still one of the most cited and controversial concurrent causation cases in the country.

 Thus, in the case of West American Insurance Co. v. Hinze, 843 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1988), a federal appeals court (applying Illinois law) upheld the dismissal of the insurer's motion for a declaratory judgment. The insurer had sought to establish that it was not liable to the insured where the facts were that the insured had left his three-year-old grandson unattended in his car and the car rolled into Lake Michigan, causing the child to drown. The insurer argued that the exclusion of coverage for loss “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, etc.” of a motor vehicle avoided coverage because the automobile was the excluded “instrumentality” of the loss.

 The court disagreed, holding that if the insured's liability arose from covered negligence involving non-auto related conduct, coverage applied even if an automobile was involved in the occurrence.

 A Florida case, Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Lodwick, 126 F.Supp.2d 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2000) involved coverage under a package policy, which combined auto and homeowners property and liability coverage. The Lodwick's minor son injured another party in an auto accident, and the injured party alleged negligent entrustment and negligent supervision. The injured party also alleged that combining home and auto liability rendered coverage ambiguous, and thus he should collect under both, resulting in a double payment. The court disagreed, stating, “Florida law generally recognizes that duplicate coverage for an automobile accident injury covered by an automobile policy is not ordinarily available simply by alleging negligence in entrusting the vehicle to the negligent party.” This is in contrast to the decision reached in Hinze.

 In a case involving allegations of social host negligence, Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Sampson, 550 N.E.2d 901 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990), the court of appeals applied the motor vehicle exclusion to deny coverage. The insureds hosted a party where one of their friends drank alcohol and then allowed him to borrow their car. A passenger in the car was injured and brought suit against one of the insureds on the theory that he negligently supervised the party and that he was negligent as a social host. The injured passenger argued that these acts of negligence were nonvehicle-related, but the court reasoned that the “automobile exclusion was obviously intended to omit from the homeowners' policy coverage which is obtainable under an automobile insurance policy… The homeowner can reasonably be expected to rely on that coverage [personal auto] for activities related to the ownership and operation of a motor vehicle.” For more information on social host liability, a theory of liability that has not been adopted in all states, see Liquor Liability.

 A distinction between claims based on negligent entrustment vs. those based on negligent supervision was made in Insurance Co. of North America v. Krigos, 553 N.E.2d 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). The insured was sued on both theories after her son injured another driver while driving her car. The court dismissed a claim for coverage based on negligent entrustment before discussing the claim for coverage based on negligent supervision. The policy in question contained the negligent entrustment exclusion. The injured party argued that there was coverage despite the negligent entrustment exclusion because the exclusion was ambiguous. The ambiguity supposedly arose because the negligent entrustment exclusion did not contain the word use in the pertinent sentence, but the court held that the “manner in which a piece of property becomes the instrument of an injury is irrelevant to a claim for negligent entrustment.” Following a developing line of cases, the court held that a claim for negligent entrustment is composed of two elements: (1) an allegation of a negligent entrustment, and (2) that the inexperience or recklessness of the person to whom the property was entrusted was the proximate cause of the loss. Because the entrustment of the instrument (the motor vehicle) was excluded, there was no need to exclude the “use” of the vehicle.

 The court then discussed the claim for “negligent supervision.” The policy did not, as many policies did not, contain a specific exclusion barring coverage for such claims. INA argued that because the injury was caused by the motor vehicle, the policy excluded coverage (presumably under the “arising out of the use, etc.” language). The court agreed that there was no coverage, but not for this reason, following instead a theory based on whether the injury was caused solely by an excluded proximate cause. Thus, the court reasoned, if there is a claim for negligent supervision, it can succeed if “the policy does not specifically exclude claims arising from negligent supervision, and the underlying complaint alleges that negligent supervision was a proximate cause of the injury…regardless of whether the policy excluded another alleged cause of the injury.” The court found no coverage in this case because the son's independent acts “severed the causal connection between any negligent supervision by [the mother] and [the injured party's] injuries.” The court gave some examples of circumstances that might give rise to coverage for negligent supervision, such as allegations that the parent was in the car when the injury occurred, that the child's negligence was the result of the parent's failure to counsel the child's driving, or that the parent gave negligent driving instructions. Because none of these facts was involved, coverage for negligent supervision did not apply.

 Maintenance, Occupancy, Use, or Operation of a Motor Vehicle

 The terms “maintenance, occupancy, operation, and use” are undefined for purposes of the liability and medical payments exclusions, so it has been left up to the courts to interpret their meanings. The result has been a rather narrow interpretation of the exclusions by certain jurisdictions.

 A case upholding the maintenance exclusion is State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Salas, 222 Cal.App.3d 268 (1990). The trial court had found that the insured's failure to warn the person welding his tire rim that he had filled the tire with a flammable tire leak sealant was negligence independent of the maintenance that resulted in injury. The appeals court reversed this ruling, stating, “[a]n attempt to preserve a tire's air pressure easily fits within the scope of routine automobile maintenance. It does not strain the imagination to conclude that all drivers know that without air pressure, their wheels will not roll.”

 A Florida case, Indiana Insurance Co. v. Winston, 377 So. 2d 718 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979), also involved the maintenance exclusion. In Winston, the insured, his sons, and a friend were involved in adding an air scoop to the hood of the insured's car. The car's hood had been removed and the hinges (still on the vehicle) were pushed down. As a friend of the insured's sons was leaning on the car, one of the hood hinges unexpectedly released, striking the young man in the eye. Taking on the issue of whether injury to a bystander arises out of maintenance for purposes of the exclusion, the court said: “While we acknowledge that the injured party in this case was not himself actively engaged in the maintenance of the car at the time of the injury, we still believe that his injury arose from a condition created during the maintenance of the vehicle. The term 'maintenance' has been defined as the labor of keeping something in a state of repair or efficiency… Appleman, in his treatise, indicates that the term maintenance would seem to include acts of either commission or omission relative to the external or mechanical condition of a vehicle…We find that the control and subsequent placement of the hinge played an inseparable role in the installation of the air scoop, whose installation can be defined as the maintenance of the automobile (i.e., it keeps the vehicle in a state of efficiency).”

 A later Florida case similarly found that injury to the insured's helper was excluded from coverage by the maintenance exclusion. The insured, who was pouring gasoline into his truck's carburetor, reacted instinctively by throwing the cup of gasoline that had ignited. The cup of burning gasoline struck his helper. The case is Volkswagen Insurance Co. v. Nguyen, 405 So. 2d 190 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981).

 An Ohio case had to be remanded to the trier of fact to determine the location of an accident involving a dirt bike. An allegation of negligent maintenance was made; the argument being that even if the accident occurred off the insured premises, the negligent maintenance occurred on the premises and there was coverage for injury occurring on the premises. In the case of Giel v. American National Property and Casualty Co., 2001 WL 1216955, Murphy was injured while riding a dirt bike belonging to the Giels. The court said the exclusion was clear and dismissed the Giels' theory of coverage, but since the insurer had acknowledged there would be coverage if the injury occurred on the residence premises and the trial court had not established the location of the accident, the case was returned to a jury.

 Other courts have adopted a broad definition of maintenance. For example, the court in Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 357 N.W.2d 519 (S. D. 1984), denied homeowners coverage under an exclusion that eliminated coverage when bodily injury arose out of “the… maintenance… of… any recreational motor vehicle owned by the insured, if the bodily injury or property damage occurs away from the residence premises…” The appeal to the state supreme court was made after a trial court granted a summary judgment motion to the homeowners insurer.

 The appealing parties argued that the loss did not fall within the maintenance exclusion because the exclusion should apply only when loss resulted from improper vehicle maintenance. In this case, the insured went to his place of employment, where he apparently stored his go-cart and started a fire while welding the go-cart's axle. The fire spread throughout the building and did considerable damage. The appealing parties took the position that since the loss was not the result of the axle itself having been improperly maintained, the exclusion did not apply.

 The court found this argument “much too restrictive.” The court found that maintenance meant “the labor of keeping something in a state of repair or efficiency.” The court also held that arising out of is much broader in scope than caused by, and that arising out of is synonymous with “originating from,” “having its origin in,” “growing out of,” or “flowing from.” Because the damage arose from a condition that the insured created during the vehicle's maintenance, the exclusion applied.

 Occupancy has been the focus of other cases. Although the AAIS homeowners forms have included occupancy within the exclusionary language for some time, it has only been with the 2000 homeowners that ISO has incorporated the word into the motor vehicle exclusion.

 In the case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Johnston, 984 P.2d 10 (Ariz. 1999), the homeowners policy language excluded coverage when the insured was alleged to have been riding in a truck and pointing a gun at another vehicle. When the other vehicle swerved to get away, it struck a pole and the passenger was injured. The passenger sued the gun-pointing insured, who tendered defense to his parents' homeowners insurer. The court found that the language “arising out of” argued for a causal connection between the injury and the vehicle: if a causal connection existed, the auto policy applied, but if not, then the homeowners policy applied. The insured's occupancy of the vehicle was not incidental, but on the contrary caused the other vehicle to lose control. Therefore, the homeowners exclusion applied.

 This was in contrast to an earlier Arizona case, Ruiz v. Farmers Insurance Company, 865 P.2d 762 (Ariz. 1993). Here, the court ruled that a gunshot injury sustained in a car-to-car shooting did not arise out of the use of a vehicle because the injury was caused by a shotgun. The court said the vehicle was used as a gun platform, not a car. (This case involved an auto policy, not a homeowners.)  The court in Johnston distinguished Ruiz by stating that the use of the vehicle caused the injury, not, as in the Ruiz case, a gun.

 And in the case of Gallegos v. Allstate Insurance Co., 797 A.2d 795 (Md. 2002), the homeowners exclusion was upheld in the case of a home day care provider who negligently left a small child in a hot vehicle while she cleaned a house. The child died of hyperthermia, and the parents sued. The auto policy's limits were paid, but the much higher homeowners limit of liability was called upon. But the court said the word occupancy was clear in the exclusion, and did not mean, as the plaintiffs alleged, that it only applied while a vehicle was moving. 

 The next terms to consider are use and operation. A person can use a motor vehicle without actually operating it; for example, one household member can ask another to run an errand which serves the purpose of the first household member. Thus, the second person is operating the vehicle, but the first is using it. In ascertaining whether a vehicle's use has caused injury or damage, many courts look to see if there is a direct causal connection between the vehicle and the injury. In other words, could the injury have occurred without the vehicle's use? If so, then the exclusion is generally not applied.

 In American Modern Home v. Rocha, 729 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), the court refused to invoke the motor vehicles exclusion because there was no causal connection between the use of a vehicle and an injury. The circumstances giving rise to the case involved use of the trailer hitch on the insured auto. A rope attached to the hitch was used to help hoist a slaughtered steer onto a tripod. The tripod collapsed, injuring one of men assisting in the operation. The insured's homeowners carrier attempted to deny coverage because the insured was “using” his motor vehicle at the time of the accident. The court disagreed, stating that a mere connection between the use of a motor vehicle and a subsequent injury is not sufficient for application of the motor vehicle exclusion; the injury must be proximately caused by the use of the vehicle in order for the exclusion to apply.

 A Louisiana court said that the use of a vehicle should be central to the injury in order for the exclusion to apply. A son was cutting a tree limb, while his father had attached one end of a rope to the limb and the other to his van. The intent was to pull the limb away from the house as it separated from the tree. The father began to drive the van, the rope tightened, and the son was knocked off the ladder and was injured. The court said that some neighbors could just have easily pulled the rope, and in that case, coverage would apply. Injury solely from the use of the motor vehicle was not the case, so the exclusion did not apply. This case is Trammel v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 811 So. 2d 78 (La. Ct. App. 2002).

 Other states have followed this logic. In Kalell v. Mutual Fire and Auto Ins. Co., 471 N.W.2d 865 (Ia. 1991), involving circumstances similar to Trammel, a truck owner attached a rope to a tree limb and attempted to pull it down. It struck a bystander, injuring him. The court rejected the insurer's request for summary judgment, referring the case to a trier of fact to determine if the injury resulted solely from the negligent use of the motor vehicle.

 Similar reasoning was applied in Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. v. Cegla, 381 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). A roll of wire mesh fell from the back of the insured's truck while he was driving down the highway. As a result, the motorcyclist behind him lost control of his motorcycle and was struck and killed by another vehicle. Claims were submitted to both the insured's automobile and homeowners insurers. The homeowners carrier denied coverage based on the motor vehicle exclusion. It was the trial court's decision (subsequently upheld by the appellate court) that the insured's failure to tie down the wire mesh to keep it from rolling out of the truck bed was a non-vehicle related act and injury resulting therefrom was exempt from the motor vehicle exclusion of the homeowners policy.

 In IMT Insurance Co. v. Amundsen, 376 N.W.2d 105 (Ia. 1985), the court held that to constitute use or operation of a motor vehicle, an element of control by the insured is required. In this case, the insured was a scoutmaster whose scout troop was collecting corn on a nearby farm. The boys were being transported by a wagon attached to the farmer's tractor that was being driven by the farmer's son. One of the scouts was injured when he fell from the wagon tongue where he was riding. The court reasoned that since the tractor was not in the insured's control, the motor vehicle exclusion did not apply to void coverage from his homeowners policy.

 Running an auxiliary motor for the purpose of turning on lights and air conditioning was held as not constituting operation of a vehicle by the court in General Accident Insurance Co. of America v. Casteel, 1990 WL 927. The minor son of an auto repair shop owner entered the vehicle after hours with his girlfriend; he started the auxiliary motor for lights and air conditioning. This action introduced large amounts of carbon monoxide into the motor home, killing the boy and permanently injuring his friend. The lower court had found that this action was a use of the motor vehicle, but not an operation, and that therefore the insurer was not relieved of its obligation. The court did not elaborate on the fact that a “use” had been found and instead concentrated on the issue of whether there had been an “operation” of the vehicle. The court's reasoning seems to have been that the “use” was non-vehicle related and that “operation” of a vehicle requires having control of it as the driver.

 But under similar circumstances a court viewed two concurrent acts—excluded operation of a motor vehicle and nonexcluded closing a garage door—and said that because one action was not excluded it did not mean that coverage applied. A father arrived home after having drunk substantial quantities of alcohol. He drove his car into the garage and closed the garage door, but left the motor running. He was later found dead in the car with his wife and son dead in the house. The daughter, who had been away at school, brought action against her father's estate. The court said that operation was not ambiguous, and that served to eliminate coverage. Interestingly, the case of Partridge, above, was viewed (see discussion under the heading Negligent Entrustment and Negligent Supervision), but the court noted “The California Supreme Court itself has restricted or limited the use of Partridge…” This case is Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Clarke, 475 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1991).

 Severability of Interests versus Motor Vehicle Exclusion

 The effect of the severability clause of the homeowners policy on the motor vehicles exclusion (specifically the portion of the exclusion referring to ownership and operation of a vehicle) was examined in Worcester Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marnell, 496 N.E.2d 158 (Mass. 1986). In this case, the Marnells gave permission to their son to host a party at their home and to serve alcoholic beverages even though he was under age for their legal consumption. After the party, the son, who was drunk, used his own car to take guests home. While driving, he struck and killed Robert Alioto.

 The court agreed with the insurance company's defense that although the son was an insured under his parent's homeowners policy, since he owned and operated the vehicle involved in the accident, the motor vehicle exclusion clearly applied to remove coverage for him. However, when the court examined the severability of interests clause of the policy—promising to apply the insurance of the policy separately to each insured—it determined that the term “insured” in the motor vehicle exclusion only applied to the person claiming coverage under the policy, in this case, the son. Since the vehicle was not owned or operated by either Mr. or Mrs. Marnell, the motor vehicles exclusion did not apply and the homeowners policy was required to provide both defense and indemnification of the parents.

 On appeal to the supreme court of Massachusetts, the defense issue was upheld; the actual coverage issue was deferred pending further action by Alioto.

 But in the case of Gorzen v. Westfield Ins. Co., 526 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), the court reached a different conclusion. All claims against the parents were derivative of the claim against their son, and the exclusion was clear and unambiguous. In this situation, Tim Hubbard was driving when he was involved in an accident in which his passengers, the Gorzens, were killed. The Gorzen boys' parents brought suit against the Hubbards, alleging negligent supervision. The Gorzens argued the severability of insurance clause should operate to provide defense and indemnification, but the court held otherwise.

 Exceptions to the Motor Vehicle Exclusion

 Four types of vehicles are excepted from the exclusion. First, although both AAIS and ISO include trailers within the scope of the definition of a motor vehicle, there is coverage while the trailer is detached from or not being carried on a motor vehicle. Second, golf carts while used for playing golf fall outside the exception. ISO 2000 and 2011 homeowners forms and AAIS HO 0003 09 08 also cover usage of golf carts within the boundaries of a private residential community where such usage is allowed. It is the next two exceptions to the exclusion which have generated most confusion, so these are discussed in depth below. The exceptions are recreational vehicles, and vehicles in dead storage.

 Recreational Vehicles

 An exception to the motor vehicle exclusion allows coverage for liability arising from the use of nonowned recreational vehicles whether they are on or off an insured location. Owned recreational vehicles, on the other hand, are covered for liability only while on an insured location. (“Insured location” is a defined term.)

 Whether a particular recreational conveyance meets the requirements of the exception has been the issue in numerous court cases. For instance, three cases considered by the Florida courts determined that mopeds fit the exception, and were thereby covered for liability under the homeowners policies. In each case, the decision was based on the fact that Florida statutes regarding licensing, registration, traffic control, and insurance classify mopeds as bicycles, not vehicles, motor vehicles or self-propelled vehicles. The cases are Ortiz v. Bankers Standard Insurance Company, 475 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Lane v. Allstate Insurance Company, 472 So. 2d 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), and Velez v. Criterion, 461 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1985).

 A case to the contrary is Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Michigan v. Stark, 437 Mich. 175 (Mich. 1991). In this case, the court held that a moped was not exempted from the exclusion and that there was no homeowners liability coverage. The policy defined a “motor vehicle” as “a land motor vehicle…designed for travel on public roads…” The insureds first argued that a moped was not a “land motor vehicle” but met with no success, since the court pointed out that the state Motor Vehicle Code described a motor vehicle broadly as “every vehicle which is self-propelled.” The insureds also argued that since mopeds were exempted from the state no-fault law, they could not be viewed as motor vehicles. The court countered this argument by pointing out that the exemption from the no-fault law had been based on certain cost and risk factors which would have made no-fault coverage for mopeds too expensive for most prospective insureds. The insureds also argued that mopeds were covered “recreational motor vehicles.” However, the court concurred with an earlier Michigan appeals court “there is no question that a moped is designed for travel on public roads since such use is expressly recognized and regulated in the Michigan Vehicle Code.” Since the moped was not designed for use off public roads, it was not a covered recreational vehicle.

 The use of a recreational motor vehicle on an insured location—or, more specifically, what an insured location is—has been debated. In the case of Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Prevatte, 423 S.E.2d 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), the insureds regularly used a neighbor's adjacent property for walks and ATV rides. The court found that the adjacent property constituted an insured location. However, in the case of Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Clifford, 896 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Ore. 1995) the insured's regular use of a relative's adjacent property to store property and burn trash did not make the property an insured location.

 The current ISO homeowners form has added wording to the exception that would preclude coverage previously found in the homeowners forms. This is that there is no coverage “if at the time and place of the 'occurrence' the involved 'motor vehicle' is not registered for use on public roads or property, but such registration is required by a law, or regulation issued by a government agency, for it to be used at the place of the 'occurrence'…” Such policy language would have precluded coverage in the case of MacLean v. Hingham Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 750 N.E.2d 494. Tracey MacLean was injured while a passenger on an ATV owned by another person and driven by Jeffrey MacLean in a schoolyard. (It is assumed the MacLeans did not reside together because the defense of the “injury to an insured” exclusion apparently was not raised.) Tracey brought action against Jeff's parents' homeowners' carrier for her injuries. The insurer denied the claim, stating that the ATV was a motor vehicle subject to motor vehicle registration. However, the court said that it was subject to environmental registration under the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and the Environment, not the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. Therefore, there was coverage. Had the ISO current language been in place, it would be hard to argue for coverage, since the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and the Environment is a government agency.

 Dead Storage

 The fourth category of vehicles excepted from the motor vehicle exclusion of the homeowners policy begins with the requirement that it must be a vehicle or conveyance that is “not subject to motor vehicle registration,” in the ISO 1991 homeowners. The wording in the 2011 form is slightly different, “not required to be registered for use on public roads or property” but the intent is the same.

 Under typical motor vehicle registration statutes, vehicles subject to registration are those, which are operated or driven upon the public roads or highways. Once it is determined that a vehicle is not subject to registration, in order for liability coverage to apply, it must be one of three types of vehicles: (1) one that is used to service an insured's residence (a garden tractor or an auto used exclusively on the insured premises fits this description); (2) one that is designed for assisting the handicapped (a motorized wheel chair, for instance); or, (3) one that is in “dead storage” on an insured location. The ISO 2000 forms have made some alterations that, as of this writing, have not forced any coverage issues to court. Coverage is now more restrictive in that for coverage to apply the vehicle in question must be used solely to service an insured's residence. The 2011 form broadens this, and provides an exception when the vehicle is used solely to service a residence. It does not have to be the insured's residence, just a residence. Therefore, the insured can take a tractor down the street to help a neighbor and coverage will still apply. For coverage for an occurrence involving a motorized vehicle designed to assist the handicapped, the vehicle must be in course of assisting a handicapped person or parked on an insured location.

 In addition, the ISO motor vehicle exclusion states there is no coverage if the vehicle is registered for use on public roads or property; the exception states that there is no coverage “unless the 'motor vehicle' is in dead storage on an insured location.” The AAIS forms provide coverage by stating that the insurer will pay for injury or property damage if the motorized vehicle “is not subject to motor vehicle registration because of its type or use.”

 The term “dead storage” appears in Webster's Third New International Dictionary in conjunction with the meaning of “dead”: (4g) “out of action or out of use (a dead electric circuit, a dead telephone line, dead storage).” A vehicle in “dead storage” then, is one that is out of action or out of use because it is incapable of being used in the same sense that a dead electric circuit or a dead telephone line is incapable of being used. This interpretation is strengthened by the definition of “dead storage” that is found in Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition. It states that a motor vehicle in “dead storage” has had the battery removed so that the vehicle cannot be moved under its own power. It follows then, that an insured's voluntary decision to simply discontinue using an auto—an operable sports car kept in the garage for the winter months, for instance—does not mean that it is in “dead storage” any more than a phone is “dead” when not in use or an electric outlet is “dead” if nothing is plugged into it.

 Despite the foregoing, the issue of what constitutes “dead storage” has been subject to varying court interpretations, some of which have discounted the issue of operability. For example, in a case applying Tennessee law, Sharpe v. State Farm, 558 F. Supp. 10 (E. D. Tenn. 1982), the vehicles in question were operable. This was evident from the fact that they were sometimes moved around in the insured's yard. The court felt that since they had no license plates and were not driven on the highway, they could be considered to be in dead storage.

Whether an auto is in dead storage when it is undergoing maintenance has been the subject of a number of court cases. The majority of courts that have considered this question have found that a vehicle undergoing maintenance cannot also be in dead storage.

 Several of them concern injury caused when gasoline that is poured into a carburetor ignites. A case of this type is Holliman v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 711 S.W.2d 159 (Ark. 1986). In this case the insureds admitted to driving an unregistered and unlicensed vehicle on public highways up until the morning that it would not start. Approximately a month later the insured charged the battery, inflated the tires, and filled the radiator. When gas was poured into the carburetor in an effort to start the auto, the gas ignited and injured the insured's brother.

 The court looked to a decision from a neighboring state's court (Broadway v. Great American Insurance Co., 465 So. 2d 1124 [Ala. 1985]) involving a similar situation. According to both courts, the terms “dead storage” and “maintenance of a motor vehicle” are mutually exclusive. It was the court's opinion that a motor vehicle in dead storage is one that is not undergoing maintenance, while a vehicle undergoing maintenance cannot be in dead storage. Further, “maintenance” is an unambiguous term and negligent use of a carburetor comes within its meaning. Another case taking the same position involved similar circumstances—gas poured into a carburetor catching fire and burning a bystander. Even though the car had been in dead storage for some five years, the single act of trying to start it was considered maintenance. This case is Davod v. Tanksley, 218 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2000).  

 The case of Beale v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., No. 67 Tenn. Ct. App. 1985 (LEXIS State Library Tenn. File) gives a different interpretation of the dead storage exemption regarding vehicles undergoing maintenance. Lawrence roomed at Beale's home. His inoperable, unlicensed automobile was stored in the carport on Beale's premises. After several months, Lawrence began to work on the vehicle so that it could be moved elsewhere to be stored. In the process, a spark from the battery charger ignited gasoline that had leaked from the fuel line. The resulting fire severely damaged Beale's home.

 Lawrence's insurer, State Farm, maintained that since the damage arose from maintenance performed on the vehicle, the motor vehicle exclusion—removing coverage for property damage arising from the maintenance on any motor vehicle—applied. The court disagreed, focusing on the fact that policy language of the exclusion clearly stated that the exclusion did not apply if the motor vehicle was in dead storage. According to the court's interpretation, even if maintenance was being performed, as long as the vehicle was in “dead storage,” coverage from the homeowners policy applied.

 Another case where coverage was found for an insured doing maintenance on a vehicle in “dead storage” is Allstate Insurance Co. v. Geiwitz, 587 A.2d 1185 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). The insured bought a car that he proceeded to restore for the purpose of taking it to car shows. The car was transported by trailer from place to place during the restoration process and when completed, to a car show. The insured obtained improper license plates for the restored vehicle by giving the state Motor Vehicle Administration the information on the car that he regularly drove. He wanted the license plates so that he could enter the restored car in a street car class competition. The car was never driven on the street. The car was stored in a friend's garage. The insured was heating the garage one night with a kerosene heater while fixing the gas gauge. He drained the gasoline from the car into a bucket, and the gasoline overflowed, starting a fire that destroyed the car and severely damaged the garage and other property.

 The exception to the motor vehicle exclusion in this case provided that the exclusion did not apply to “a motorized land vehicle in dead storage or used exclusively on an insured premises.”  The insurer argued that “dead” in this case meant “totally inoperable, incapable of any function whatever,” and that “storage” meant property that is put “beyond use, beyond any handling or dealing with them in the ordinary course of things.” The court took exception to defining the term “dead storage” by combining the definitions for each word, since the words were being used as a term of art. Emphasis was given to the fact that the insured in this case did not use the car for transportation, as was the situation in the majority of cases that have interpreted the meaning of “dead storage.” The court pointed out that the insured had no reason to buy coverage for the car under an automobile policy because it was not used for transportation, and that the insured could “reasonably have believed that the homeowner's policy would cover any bodily injury or property damage from a vehicle that was kept as a collectible….”

 Indeed, the circumstances of a situation may trigger coverage where none might otherwise be anticipated. In the case of Westfield Ins. Co. v. Herbert et al., 110 F.3d 24 (7th Cir. 1997), the insured was trying to remove the valve cover from a vehicle in dead storage in order to sell it. He ultimately caused an explosion that severely injured a neighbor child. The insurer denied the claim, citing the maintenance exclusion, but the court, applying Indiana law, found for coverage based on the insured's intention not to replace the valve cover on the vehicle. Therefore, maintenance was not the “efficient and predominating” cause of the loss.

 Difficulties of interpretation also arise in the case of automobiles being built from kits by the homeowners insured. Because of the court decisions finding that a vehicle cannot simultaneously be in “dead storage” and undergoing maintenance, it would be prudent to insure the vehicle under a personal auto policy as it approaches a state of operability. Of course, discussing the situation with the underwriters will help with arranging the proper type of coverage. Note that there is at least one court case holding that 30 days automatic personal auto liability coverage starts from the date of operability (not the date of acquisition) when a vehicle is being built by an insured. The case is Farmers Exchange v. Schepler, 171 Cal. Rptr. 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), discussed elsewhere; see Automatic Coverage.

 Watercraft Exclusion

 The watercraft exclusion under section II of the 1991 ISO homeowners policy (section II, exclusion 1.g.) excludes coverage for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the (1) ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of; (2) entrustment (to any person) of; or (3) vicarious liability (“parental liability” was dropped in the current forms) whether imposed by statute or common law (changed from “statutorily imposed” in the current forms) for the actions of a minor using excluded watercraft. The ISO 2000 forms add exclusions for failure to supervise and negligent supervision and for occupancy. (Refer also to the additional exclusions in the ISO 2000 forms discussed under Current Exclusions, above.) The AAIS exclusions are similar to those in the ISO 2000 forms. The ISO 2011 form is the same as the 2000 form.

 The exceptions to the exclusion are divided into two distinct subsections, one applying to boats that are sailing vessels and the other to those that are not sailing vessels. Five types of motor or engine driven boats are excepted from the exclusion, so there is section II coverage for occurrences involving:

 1. Sailing boats that are less than twenty-six feet in overall length (whether owned or rented, but not borrowed in the AAIS form; the ISO form covers owned, rented, or borrowed); or

2. Borrowed (but not rented or owned) sailing boats that are twenty-six or more feet in overall length.

With regard to engine-powered boats, the ISO form covers:

1. Boats not owned by an insured (i.e., borrowed or rented boats) that have an inboard or inboard-outdrive engine or motor or water jet pump power of fifty horsepower or less;

2. Borrowed (but not rented or owned) boats with an inboard or inboard-outdrive engine or motor or water jet power of more than fifty horsepower;

3. Boats owned by, rented to, or borrowed by an insured that have one or more outboard motors or engines with twenty-five total horsepower or less;

4. Boats owned by, rented to, or borrowed by an insured that have one or more outboard engines or motors with more than twenty-five total horsepower if the outboard engine or motor is not owned by an insured;

5. Boats owned by an insured with outboard engines or motors of more than twenty-five total horsepower if: (i) The insured acquires them before the start of the policy period and either (a) declares them at policy inception, or (b) reports the intention to insure them to the insurer within forty-five days after the insured acquires the outboard engines or motors; (ii) The insured acquires them during the policy period. Coverage then applies for the policy period.

 References to engine power or engines were added in the ISO 1991 edition. The earlier descriptions of excluded watercraft limited the description to motor power or motors. The change has little significance, however, since Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines “motor” as “any of various power units that develop energy or impart motion: as a: a small compact engine b: internal-combustion engine; esp: a gasoline engine c: a rotating machine that transforms electrical energy into mechanical energy.” The ISO 2000 form adds “including those that power a water jet pump” to clarify that personal watercraft, such as jet skis, are included in the description of watercraft. There are no changes in the 2011 form.

 The watercraft exclusion makes an exception for section II coverage for occurrences involving any of the above types of watercraft that are stored.

 An exception similar to 5., above, in a Safeco homeowners policy was termed “ambiguous” in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Lindberg, 394 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1986). The case concerned a boat with a fifty-five horsepower motor acquired after the inception of the insured's homeowners policy and not reported to the insurer at policy renewal. The language of the exception within the watercraft exclusion of Safeco's policy addressed such outboard motors acquired prior to the policy term and required them to be declared either at the inception of the policy or reported to the company within forty-five days of acquisition for coverage to apply. No mention was made of boats and motors acquired after the policy period.

 The court examined the meaning of “acquired prior to the policy term” and “inception of the policy” as to whether they referred to the beginning of the initial policy term or the beginning of each renewal term. According to the insurer, each policy renewal constituted the inception of a new policy and therefore the insured would have had to report the boat and motor at the time of renewal to have coverage for them. In contrast, the insured's—and ultimately the court's—interpretation was that a renewal policy is a continuation of the original policy, that it merely extends the original policy term for an additional year.

 In the opinion of the court, the watercraft exclusion “defies any common sense interpretation; the word 'renewal' is not used, and the words 'policy,' 'term,' and 'period' are not always used with precision.” Because of this ambiguity, and the fact that the acquisition of the boat and motor did not occur prior to the inception of the policy, the watercraft exclusion was found not to apply.

 Overall, however, the courts have had a much easier time with watercraft exclusionary language than with motor vehicles. In one case, Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. of Salem County v. Allstate Insurance Co. et al, 775 A.2d 514 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), a wrongful death action was brought against the insureds when a child drowned while swimming from their boat. The homeowners insurer, Farmers, fearing to be brought into the suit filed for declaratory judgment, and the court said it was clear that there was a “substantial nexus between the use of the boat and the accident.” Thus, it was clear that the boatowners policy provided coverage and the homeowners exclusions precluded either defense or indemnity.

 In addition, in the case of Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Wittekind, 730 N.E. 2d 1054 (Oh. App. 1999), the defendant tried to argue that a jet ski was a personal watercraft and thus the word watercraft was ambiguous. The judge essentially said that was nonsense and the rented sixty horsepower Ski-Doo involved in the negligent death of another fell outside the exception for coverage.

 Aircraft and Hovercraft Exclusions

 Like the two exclusions just discussed, the aircraft exclusion (section II, exclusion 1.h.) excludes coverage for bodily injury or property damage arising out of (1) ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of an aircraft, (2) entrustment by an insured of an aircraft to any person, and (3) vicarious liability (“parental liability” was dropped in the current forms) whether imposed by statute or common law (changed from “statutorily imposed” in the current policy) for the actions of a child or minor using an aircraft.

 Aircraft is defined within the exclusion as “any contrivance used or designed for flight, except model or hobby aircraft not used or designed to carry people or cargo.” The ISO 2000 form adds hovercraft, including air cushion and ground effect (flarecraft) vehicles. The AAIS form also defines aircraft and hovercraft in the definitions section. In 2017, ISO created an endorsement modifying the policy to include unmanned aircraft as aircraft due to the popularity of drones. Drones are therefore excluded, as are any other aircraft.

 Some questions raised by the aircraft exclusion are similar to those in the line of motor vehicle exclusion cases dealing with claims of negligent supervision (discussed above). For example, in Wilkins v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 388 S.E.2d 191 (N. C. Ct. App. 1990), the insured owned an interest in a corporation called Mountain Scenic Aero. A plane belonging to the corporation crashed, killing two people and injuring two others. Among the claims brought against the insured were the claims that he failed to warn the pilot of damage that he had done to the plane and that he had negligently failed to instruct the pilot about proper operation of the airplane. The court found no coverage under the homeowners policy, stating, “[a]lthough the allegations of failure to warn and improper instruction are theories of liability which do not depend upon plaintiff's direct involvement with the operation of the airplane, the exclusionary language requires only that the injuries arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any aircraft.”

 The court cited other cases that had reached a similar conclusion. Among them were: Safeco Insurance Co. v. Husker Aviation, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 745 (Neb. 1982), in which the court rejected the insured's argument that there was coverage for a claim based on the negligent training of a pilot (the two insurance policies involved were not homeowners policies—one was an aircraft hull liability policy and the other was an airport fixed based operator's liability policy); Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), in which the insured was not covered for allegations of negligent pre-flight planning and misrepresentations of the extent of the pilot's experience; and John Deere Insurance Co. v. Penna, 416 N.W.2d 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), where the court held that the insured's liability arising from injuries sustained by an inexperienced parachutist who accompanied him on a jump was within the bounds of the exclusion—the court found that parachuting is “so intimately associated with the use of the airplane as to be inseparable from it.”

 The court in Ivey v. First of Georgia Insurance Company, 434 S.E.2d 556 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) had no difficulty in stating that an attempt by an instructor on the ground to teach someone flying in an aircraft constituted use and was therefore excluded. The court said, somewhat caustically, “It is impossible to imagine a circumstance in which a flight instructor could provide ground to air instruction without the involvement of an airplane. We do not need to stretch the meaning of [the word use] to conclude that both Ivey and Smith [the instructor] were using the plane at the time of the tragic accident.”

 Exception to the Motor Vehicle, Watercraft, and Aircraft Exclusions

 Although both AAIS and ISO forms state that there is no liability coverage for certain motor vehicles or watercraft or for aircraft, both forms state that the exclusions do not apply to liability for bodily injury to a residence or domestic employee arising out of and in the course of such employee's employment by an insured.

 Thus, if a domestic employee is injured while loading an insured's luggage onto an airplane, there is coverage unless otherwise excluded.