The Florida Supreme Court, reversing a lower court's decision in an insurance bad faith case, has ruled that the hours expended by counsel for a defendant insurance company were “relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of time expended by counsel for the plaintiff,” and discovery of that information, where disputed, fell within the “sound decision of the trial court.”
The Case
Kelly Paton alleged that she was injured in a car accident due to the negligence of an underinsured driver. After GEICO General Insurance Company failed to pay the total amount claimed by Ms. Paton under the underinsured motorist (“UM”) policy maintained by her mother, she sued the insurer.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Paton for $469,247, which the trial court reduced to $100,000, the limit of the UM policy.
Ms. Paton subsequently amended her complaint to add a claim of bad faith against GEICO under Florida Statutes Section 624.155. She obtained a jury verdict in her favor for $369,247, the amount of the excess verdict in the UM trial.
Thereafter, Ms. Paton moved for attorneys' fees and costs, and she sought discovery related to her opposition's attorneys' time records. Specifically, Ms. Paton served on opposing counsel a request to produce the following records:
- Any and all time keeping slips and records regarding time spent defending GEICO in the bad faith action.
- Any and all bills, invoices, and/or other correspondence for payment of attorneys' fees for defending GEICO in the bad faith action.
- Any and all retainer agreements between the lawyer or the lawyer's firm for defending GEICO in the bad faith action.
GEICO objected to the request to produce on the basis that the information was privileged and irrelevant. The trial court overruled GEICO's objections, but provided that GEICO “may redact privileged information.”
Ms. Paton also propounded “Lodestar/Multiplier Fee Determination” interrogatories to GEICO. GEICO objected to the following interrogatory:
8. Did you or your attorneys spend any attorney's time in prosecuting or defending this lawsuit? If so, list a description of each such item of attorney's fees, the date incurred, hourly rate and the hours incurred on each such date. (Note: you may answer this question by stapling your time records to the answers to interrogatories as long as those records are legible and complete or indicating that you are relying on attached time records for your answer).
The trial court again overruled GEICO's objection; this order, however, did not reference redaction of any privileged information.
An intermediate appellate court quashed the trial court's orders, declaring that the billing records of counsel for GEICO were “at best, only marginally relevant.”
The dispute reached the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court's Decision
The court reversed, holding that the billing records of opposing counsel were relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of time expended in a claim for attorneys' fees, and their discovery fell within the discretion of the trial court when the fees were contested.
In its decision, the court stated that, when a party filed for attorneys' fees against an insurance company pursuant to Florida Statutes Sections 624.155 and 627.428, the billing records of the defendant insurance company were relevant. In the court's view, the hours expended by the attorneys for the insurance company would “demonstrate the complexity of the case along with the time expended, and may belie a claim that the number of hours spent by the plaintiff was unreasonable,” or that the plaintiff was “not entitled to a full lodestar computation, including a multiplying factor.”
Moreover, the court also ruled, the entirety of the billing records were “not privileged,” and where the trial court specifically stated that any privileged information may be redacted, the plaintiff “should not be required to make an additional special showing to obtain the remaining relevant, non-privileged information.” The court concluded, therefore, that the appellate court had “improperly infringed on the sound discretion of the trial court and required [Ms.] Paton to meet an unnecessarily high standard.”
The court declared that the trial court had “correctly concluded the discovery was relevant and provided that GEICO could redact any privileged information.” Therefore, compliance with the discovery orders “did not depart from the essential requirements of the law and would not result in any irreparable harm to GEICO.” Moreover, it stated, the appellate court not only “improperly” granted an “extraordinary remedy based on its simple disagreement with the trial court order,” but it “erroneously quashed legally correct trial court orders that allowed for the discovery of relevant and non-privileged information.”
The case is Paton v. GEICO General Ins. Co., No. SC14–282 (Fla. March 24, 2016). Attorneys involved include: Bard Daniel Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, and Richard Mark Benrubi of Liggio Benrubi, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner; James Kendall Clark of Clark, Robb, Mason, Coulombe, Buschman & Charbonnet, Miami, Florida, for Respondent.


