The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, reversing a trial court's decision, has ruled that an insurance carrier had an obligation to defend its insured in a lawsuit brought by a homeowner's association where, given the state's “liberal notice-pleading standard,” the “facts that might be proved at trial potentially fall within the coverage provided” by the policy.
The Case
Janet Howe and Rajesh Mandekar (together, “Howe”) owned one of four condominiums in the River Knoll Farms Condominium in Kittery, Maine. The River Knoll Farms Condominium Association sued Howe, alleging, among other things, (1) nuisance, (2) negligence, and (3) a violation of 7 M.R.S. § 3952 (Keeping a Dangerous Dog). All three counts arose primarily from the alleged conduct of Howe's dog.
MMG Insurance Company, which had issued a homeowner's insurance policy to Howe, declined to defend her in the litigation on the ground that the association's complaint alleged that Howe's dog was a nuisance, not that it had caused any “bodily injury” or “property damage” and, therefore, that the complaint sought only equitable relief not covered by the policy.
Howe filed a complaint against MMG in a trial court in Maine, seeking a declaratory judgment requiring MMG to defend her as required by the policy.
The trial court entered judgment for MMG, finding that (1) the nuisance count of the association's complaint sought only injunctive relief not covered by Howe's policy; (2) the negligence count made no claim that Howe's dog had caused bodily injury or property damage and, therefore, failed to allege the elements of the tort; and (3) no private right of action was provided by 7 M.R.S. § 3952.
The dispute reached the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's Decision
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reversed.
In its decision, it observed that the association's complaint generally alleged in the first count that Howe was “the owner[] of a dog that is vicious, threatening, and has bitten people. At all relevant times [she] had control over the dog….” The court noted that the first count of the complaint specifically asserted that Howe's actions “regarding … [her] vicious dog … constitute a nuisance. The property and other rights of the members of the Association have been substantially affected and interfered with.” Moreover, the court continued, the first count of the complaint requested injunctive relief as well as “damages, interest, penalties, costs, and [attorney] fees.”
The court then pointed out that the complaint's negligence claim also centered on the alleged conduct of Howe's dog, asserting that the dog “is vicious, threatening, and has bitten people,” and that Howe “failed to control the dog.” The court declared that the allegation that the dog had “bitten people” – “possibly fellow unit owners,” the court noted, based on allegations in a different count of the complaint – outlined a claim of bodily injury for which Howe might be answerable to the association, depending on the facts developed as the case proceeded. The court also pointed out that, like the nuisance claim, the negligence count sought as relief “damages, plus reasonable [attorney's] fees, costs and interest.”
The court said that it would not express any opinion as to whether the association's claims ultimately would succeed, or even whether they would survive until trial as the case proceeded through discovery and possible dispositive motions.
It then noted that, “Maine is a notice pleading state,” and that the “notice pleading standard … [is] forgiving,” meaning that a complaint need only “give fair notice of the cause of action by providing a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and then make a demand for that relief.
Accordingly, the court concluded, even if a complaint's claims initially were stated in general terms, so long as the complaint, read broadly in conjunction with the policy, revealed “a mere potential that the facts may come within the coverage, then the duty to defend exists.”
Here, it ruled, reviewing the complaint in light of Maine's “liberal notice-pleading standard,” facts “could be developed at a trial on the Association's complaint, as currently drafted, that would support claims potentially falling within the coverage of the policy.” Therefore, the court ruled, MMG had a duty to defend Howe against them.
The case is Howe v. MMG Ins. Co., No. YOR–13–529 (Maine June 17, 2014). Attorneys involved include: Patrick S. Bedard, Esq., Bedard & Bobrow, P.C., Eliot, on the briefs and argued, for appellants Janet Howe et al; Matthew T. Mehalic, Esq., Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC, Portland, on the briefs and argued, for appellee MMG Insurance Company.