The history of cases demonstrates that innocent coinsureds were denied recovery under early fire policies, were allowed recovery somewhat later as the underpinning doctrine was eroded, and are now allowed or denied recovery based upon the leanings of the courts of particular jurisdictions, the specific language of the insurance contract involved, or the pertinent state statute.

Recent changes in policy language have had an effect on the outcome of litigation in this area. Many of the older cases arose out of a provision that voided the policy where "an insured" had engaged in fraud or criminal conduct. The current trend is toward holding the provision that voids coverage where "any insured" has engaged in fraud as unambiguous, generally precluding insurance recovery by innocent coinsureds.

Topics covered:

Policy provisions

Court decisions

Early decisions—joint obligations

Erosion of joint responsibility doctrine

The modern view

Variations in policy language

Recovery for domestic violence victims

Policy Provisions

 Provisions related to fraud and intentional loss are found in all standard property insurance policies; it would be the exceptionally rare independently filed policy that did not likewise contain such provisions.

 In the New York standard fire policy, the "grandfather" and basis of modern property forms, there are two clauses that have been invoked to prevent insureds from recovering from intentionally set fires: the provision that voids the policy in the event of fraud committed by the insured (lines 1-6), and the exclusion of loss caused by the insured's neglect in saving and preserving the property "at and after a loss" (lines 21, 22).

 These clauses have been carried over in property policies currently in use. Following are some examples:

 ·Insurance Services Office's (ISO) Commercial Property Conditions form (CP 00 90 07 88) contains a concealment, misrepresentation, and fraud clause that voids coverage in any case of fraud "by you" (meaning the named insured) or if the named insured, or any other insured, intentionally conceals or misrepresents a material fact (see Commercial Property Conditions for a discussion of the effect of the misrepresentation clause in this form).

·The Building and Personal Property Coverage form's (CP 00 10 06 07) loss conditions, [section 3.a.(4)] requires the insured to "take all reasonable steps to protect the covered property from further damage."

·ISO's homeowners policies have similar requirements: Section I exclusion 5. (in the 2000 forms) precludes coverage where an insured has neglected to use all reasonable means to save and preserve property. Section I exclusion 8. eliminates coverage arising out of intentional loss, which is stated to mean "any loss arising out of any act an 'insured' commits or conspires to commit with the intent to cause a loss." The exclusion continues: "In the event of such loss, no 'insured' is entitled to coverage, even 'insureds' who did not commit or conspire to commit the act causing the loss." Earlier versions eliminated loss arising out of any act by or at the direction of the insured (which might be construed to limit the exclusion's effect as to a specific insured), while the current version eliminates coverage for loss arising out of any act by or at the direction of an insured, a term that contains a broader connotation.

·The conditions section of the homeowners form also contains relevant clauses. The duties after loss provision requires the insured to protect insured property from further damage. The concealment or fraud clause states that the insurer will "provide coverage to no 'insureds' under this policy if, whether before or after a loss, an 'insured' has: 1. Intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance; 2. Engaged in fraudulent conduct; or 3. Made false statements; relating to this insurance." This marks a change from the 1991 homeowners forms, which allowed the insurer to void the entire policy.

(However, as we will discuss later, various state special provisions now, in fact, allow for innocent coinsureds to collect, although often only under certain circumstances.)

·ISO's businessowners standard package policy includes a provision in the duties in the event of loss section that requires the insured to take all reasonable steps to protect the covered property from further damage, but contains no concealment or fraud clause. The special businessowners form adds an exclusion of dishonest or criminal acts by the insured, partners, or employees.

 Although the intent of these clauses in modern forms may be said to be similar to the standard fire policy, the language of the newer policies is more explicit regarding coverage for joint insureds for losses involving fraud. The language of the AAIS businessowners form, for example, that voids coverage "if any insured has concealed or misrepresented any material fact or has committed fraud." This language is significantly different from the standard fire policy's references to "the insured." Under a policy that is voided by certain actions of "any" insured, innocent coinsureds will be denied recovery in the event of arson committed by one of their number, unless the jurisdiction declares the concept of denying coverage to innocent coinsureds against public policy in some regard, runs contra to state insurance law, or finds the policy ambiguous in some fashion.

 Court Decisions

 What follows is a summary of court decisions addressing the issue of recovery by innocent coinsureds for arson losses. While many of the cases discussed are concerned with the most typical set of circumstances out of which this issue arises—arson committed by one spouse without the knowledge or cooperation of the other—it should be kept in mind that other loss situations—those involving corporate coinsureds, theft, or other types of loss, fraud involving assessment or proof of loss—illustrate the same issue and have at various times been subjected to the same arguments for or against recovery.

 Early Decisions—Joint Obligations

 The vast majority, if not all, of the early decisions held that an innocent coinsured could not recover under the insurance policy where another insured purposely set fire to insured property. The case can be made, therefore, that the more recent "tinkering" with the standard provision is to reestablish the position that recovery by innocent coinsureds is not contemplated under property insurance policies, a position that was eroded by judicial opinions. The argument that one insured's arson prevents recovery by any of the policy's insureds is grounded on the principle that qualifying as joint insureds on a policy imposes on coinsureds a joint responsibility to abide by the policy's conditions.

 This is particularly true regarding homeowners policies. Because husband and wife generally own a home either as joint tenants or as tenants by the entirety (as determined by state law), they each have an interest in the whole so that in event of the death of one spouse the other takes possession of the whole property. These are based, according to Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), on "the common-law theory that husband and wife are one person, and survivorship is the predominant and distinguishing feature of each." And, under the common-law theory of "one person" within a marriage, the deeds of the one—or at the very least, the knowledge of those deeds—are often imputed to the other.

 But, Couch on Insurance (Third Edition; 10 Couch § 149:49) states, "There is a wide range of authority dealing with the problem of recovery by an innocent coinsured spouse when it is certain that the other spouse intentionally set the fire in question. Initially, it should be noted that whether arson by one coinsured spouse bars innocent coinsured spouse from recovering under policy depends not on property rationales or marital rights and obligations, but on contract analysis of insurance policy provisions."

 In essence, it is the contract of insurance that governs and not the legal theory that governs; however, it is possible that the contractual provisions had their origins in the common law.

 The principle is explained in an early and often cited decision of a Pennsylvania court—Matyuf v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351 (Ct. Common Pleas, Penn., 1933)—in ruling that an innocent insured wife could not recover the loss of insured property intentionally burned by her husband. The court stated, "When two joint owners of property are jointly insured by one policy it is implied, by the very nature and fundamental purpose of the insurance contract, that both of the assureds shall observe good faith toward the insurer." The court ruled that "a fraudulent and felonious burning by either of the joint owners who are jointly insured is not included within the contemplated risks."

 The "joint responsibility of joint insureds" principle was often used as the basis for courts denying recovery to innocent coinsureds and has carried over in many jurisdictions. For example, see United Services Automobile Association v. McCants, 944 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997). Here, the insurer offered evidence that the wife intentionally burned the home she shared with her husband. Although the wife was a coinsured, the property was not held in joint tenancy. Because of this, a lower court ruled in favor of the husband's receiving coverage, but on appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the decision was reversed. The court looked at the terms of the contract, particularly the definitions for "you" and "your" and said both were insureds and therefore the exclusion for intentional loss and the condition for concealment or fraud applied to both.

 But in some states, innocent coinsureds prevail over insurers as a matter of law. Those cases finding for recovery for the innocent coinsured generally do so on the basis of a conflicting insurance statute. For example, in Ponder v. Allstate Ins.Co., 729 F.Supp. 60 (E.D. Mich. 1990), the exclusion for concealment or fraud stated that the policy would be void if any insured intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact before or after a loss. But the Michigan Standard Fire Policy, in accordance with the State Insurance Code, stated that the policy would be void if the insured willfully concealed or misrepresented a material fact. The court said that this clause had been interpreted in Michigan to protect an innocent insured, and so the insured husband who committed arson could not recover, but his innocent wife could.

 In Williams v. Auto Club Group Ins. Co., 569 N.W.2d 403 (Mich. App. 1997), the insurer denied a claim by an innocent spouse when her husband committed arson based upon the presumed repeal of the Michigan statute. The court said that although the statute had been repealed, another had been enacted covering the same subject, and the court presumed that the new statute merely repeated the previous wording in a more readable form and did not deprive an innocent coinsured of intended coverage.

 In other cases, it is some ambiguity in the contract (as in the line of cases finding the fraud clause's reference to "the insured" to limit the clause's application to the guilty insured) that leads to coverage for an innocent coinsured. Those cases finding no recovery for innocent coinsureds are contemporarily based on the clear language of the modern revisions to the fraud clause (i.e., referring to "any insured" or "an insured," where "an" means one or more insureds, rather than "the insured").

 It is interesting to note that the "joint responsibility" doctrine was the view taken by the vast majority of courts at the time of the development of standard fire policies, including the 1943 New York standard fire policy. Under this theory, while there may be multiple insureds for coverage purposes, there is but one insured—the insured—for policy obligations purposes. It is not surprising, therefore, that reference to "the insured" is made in the fraud provision of those policies, rather than to "an insured" or "any insured." As long as the view of the courts was that insurance policy obligations were centered in the insured, and were not severable as to individual insureds, recovery by innocent coinsureds was not an issue. It might be further deduced that the fraud provision was originally intended to incorporate this view; therefore, it may be said that the intent of the original drafters of standard fire policies was not to cover losses of an innocent insured.

 Note the inconsistency regarding the holding in Ponder, discussed earlier. In Ponder, the more restrictive modern language voiding the policy if any insured engages in fraud was held to be inconsistent with the language of the Michigan Standard Fire Policy, which refers to "the insured" (like many states, Michigan requires by law that insurance policies conform to provisions of the standard fire policy). Under the legal environment at the time of the development of the standard policy, innocent coinsureds could not recover for loss arising out of fraud by other insureds. Therefore, the Michigan court has actually held that today's policies must provide broader coverage, in the area of innocent coinsureds, than that provided by the standard fire policy. And, as will be discussed later, Michigan continues to take this approach.

 Coverage for property owned by business partnerships in event of arson by a partner has followed much the same history as coverage under homeowners policies. Courts generally held that the actions of one partner barred recovery for innocent partners. See, for example, Zemelman v. Boston Insurance Co., 84 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. App. 1970), in which the court held that all partners were bound by the fraud committed by one partner with regard to a contract made with a third party, so it was reasonable to hold that one partner's fraud in presenting a false claim was likewise binding on all the partners. And in Miller & Dobrin Furniture Company, Inc. v. Camden Fire Insurance Company Assoc., 150 A.2d 276 (N.J. Super. 1959), the court held that the insurer was not liable for loss to a corporate insured's property when the evidence indicated that if a corporate officer did not set the fire that destroyed much of the factory, he certainly did nothing to stop it once it was discovered. This case did not involve a partnership, but a corporation, so in reaching its finding for the insurer the court had to be convinced that the "corporate fiction" (that is, that a corporation exists as an artificial person distinct from its association of numerous individuals) could be disregarded. The "corporate fiction" would allow innocent stockholders to recover despite the officer's action. In this case, the officer owned half the stock while his son and daughter owned the other half. However, their stock was held for the benefit of their father, and he alone controlled the affairs of the corporation. Therefore, there was no coverage for this loss.

 As noted earlier, however, state law may trump. In Courts of the Phoenix v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co., 560 F.Supp. 858 (N.D. Ill. 1983), the court said that according to Illinois law, the actions of one partner were not to be attributed to other partners unless the acts were in the ordinary course of the business or were undertaken with the express or implied authority of the other partners. Because the arson committed by one partner was not within the scope of his authority, nor was it in the ordinary course of business, the other partners were entitled to recover their respective shares of the proceeds from the insurer.

 Erosion of Joint Responsibility Doctrine

 While the "no recovery" rule was the majority view for much of the twentieth century, there are early cases taking opposing views. Pro-recovery rulings stem from Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co., 29 A.2d 121 (N.H. 1942). This case involved a loss by fire of property owned by three tenants in common. The fire proved to be the intentional work of one of the three owners, and the claims of the other two under policies naming all three as joint insureds were denied on the grounds that "violation of the condition of the policies by one of three [insureds] binds the other two."

 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, however, ruled in favor of the innocent insureds' claim. Applying the "reasonable expectation" doctrine of policy construction, the court held that "the ordinary person owning an undivided interest in property, not versed in the nice distinctions of insurance law, would naturally suppose that his individual interest in the property was covered by a policy which named him without qualification as one of the persons insured."

 The Modern View

 The erosion of the joint obligations doctrine gave rise to cases interpreting fraud clauses in insurance policies under the theory that insurance contract obligations may be severable. This line of cases focused on the policy's wording and often found ambiguity, or looked at the insured's reasonable expectations, as in the Hoyt case discussed earlier. While court rulings against recovery by innocent coinsureds in arson losses are grounded in a long series of precedents dating back at least to 1884 (Monaghan v. Agricultural Fire Insurance Co., 18 N.W. 797 [Mich. 1884]), the fact is that they were replaced as majority opinion by a group of decisions holding for recovery, barring unambiguous language in the policy or other special circumstances.

 Beginning in the 1970s, recovery by innocent coinsureds even when ownership was in tenancy by the entirety began to be allowed, often based on an ambiguity as to the meaning of the term "the insured" or upon the concept that the term "insured" can be viewed as several rather than joint. This reflects a difference in how courts now viewed this issue. Rather than focusing on the ownership interest in the property and deciding whether that interest is joint or several, courts look to the provisions of the insurance contract to determine whether the meaning of "the insured" can be interpreted as several. If so, the innocent coinsured will be allowed to recover for damage caused by the act of the guilty insured. Variations in policy language will affect the outcome of cases under this view, as will be discussed later (see Variations in Policy Language).

 In Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d. 240 (N.J. Sup. 1974), the New Jersey court allowed recovery by an innocent wife for damage to a dwelling owned by her and her husband as tenants by the entirety although the damage was the result of the husband's arson. The names of the two insureds were conjoined in the policy declarations by the term "and/or." The court based its immediate ruling for recovery by the wife on the ambiguity of the conjunction and the Hoyt case's doctrine of reasonable expectation: "the use of the ambiguous phrase 'and/or' and the reasonable expectations of the insureds by reason thereof compel a determination that the fraudulent conduct by one insured should not void the policy as to the other who is completely innocent." The court addressed the question more generally, without reference to the wording of any particular policy, "With respect to a fire insurance policy covering the interests of more than one insured…there is much to commend the view that, unless the terms thereof are plainly to the contrary and in some fashion clearly called to the attention of the insureds, the obligation of the carrier should be considered several as to each person insured."

 A Rhode Island court later declined to follow the decision in Howell. In Dolcy v. Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Assn., 589 A.2d 313, (R.I. 1991), the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that whether a wife could recover hinged on whether the husband and wife's policy obligation to refrain from arson was joint, as opposed to separate. The court ruled that the obligation was joint. The husband and wife were listed under "insured's name." Arlene Dolcy had filed for divorce against her husband, Malcolm, at the time of the fire. Malcolm was under court order not to enter the premises or to interfere in any way with Arlene at home, on the street, or anywhere. Malcolm violated the order, entered the home, and set fire to the premises after assaulting Arlene, who had no control over his actions. Because the homeowners policy referred to "an insured" instead of "the insured" in the intentional loss exclusion, thus creating a joint obligation.

 In Richards v. The Hanover Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 1983), the husband intentionally burned a house insured under a homeowners policy designating both the husband and wife as named insureds, and the insurer claimed that the neglect provision in the policy created a joint obligation to preserve the property, and that the failure of one insured to so do voided coverage in the entirety. The Supreme Court of Georgia stated that whether the wife, as an innocent coinsured, could recover under the policy depended upon whether the parties to the contract intended the obligations of the coinsured to be joint or several. "The policy is silent as to whether the [insureds'] rights and obligations under the policy are to be considered joint or several. Under the circumstances, we think the policy is unclear." The court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the innocent coinsured and allowed recovery.

 In Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co. 326 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 1982), the court allowed an innocent coinsured to recover under a homeowners policy for damages caused by the intentional act of another insured. The court found the same ambiguity in the policy as the Georgia Supreme Court found in Richards but made the interesting comment that "we need not and do not decide whether an insurer may make the obligations of the insureds joint." This opens the question of whether courts may eventually find that public policy considerations may prohibit insurers from making certain obligations imposed by insurance policy joint.

 The Hedtcke opinion also discusses the scope of recovery by an innocent coinsured and the need to fashion recovery "to effectuate the public policy that guilty persons must not profit from their own wrongdoing…[T]hese valid public policy concerns can be vindicated by the court if it tailors the recovery permitted the innocent insured to guard against the possibility that the arsonist might receive financial benefit as a result of the arson. For example, the arsonist may be denied all recovery while the innocent insured may recover a pro rata share of the insurance proceeds according to his or her interest in the property."

 Variations in Policy Language

 Some insurers have attempted to counter the court's inclination to find coverage for the innocent coinsured by making more clear in the insurance policy that the fraud of a coinsured voids coverage for all insureds. This is true in many independently filed insurance contracts. This was also true of the 1991 ISO homeowners program. Condition 2. Concealment or Fraud applicable to both Sections I and II stated that the entire policy would be void "if, whether before or after a loss, an 'insured' has: a. Intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance; b. Engaged in fraudulent conduct; or c. Made false statements; relating to this insurance." This wording was changed through amendatory endorsements beginning in 1994. The condition was divided into two parts. The first, applicable to section I property, declared there would be no coverage "with respect to all 'insureds'" if there was fraud, false statements, or intentional misrepresentation of a material fact. The second, applicable to section II, declares that the insurer will not provide coverage to "one or more 'insureds'" under the same circumstances. Note that here the entire policy is no longer voided.

 The ISO 2000 homeowners forms went a step further to clarify intent that there is no coverage for intentional loss, fraud, or material misrepresentation. Following the definition for "insured" is: "Under both Sections I and II, when the word an immediately precedes the word 'insured', the words an 'insured' together mean one or more 'insureds'." Therefore, exclusion 8. intentional loss excludes coverage for "any loss arising out of any act an [read "one or more"] 'insured' commits or conspires to commit with the intent to cause a loss." The 2000 forms have also placed a concealment or fraud condition separately in sections I and II conditions. The section I condition reads "We provide coverage to no 'insureds' under this policy if, whether before or after a loss, an 'insured' has" engaged in fraudulent conduct, etc. Thus, the term "an 'insured'" is construed to mean "one or more 'insureds'."

 But again, with regard to homeowners, the policy forms are modified by state provisions that give coverage to innocent coinsureds, whether victims of domestic violence or not. That is not to say that any act taken with the intent to cause a loss will afford coverage to the innocent coinsured. California (ISO HO 01 04) restricts coverage to loss only by fire; otherwise the concealment or fraud condition operates to preclude coverage for all insureds. Louisiana's form (ISO HO 01 17) excludes loss "arising out of any act committed by you or at your direction…" Because "you" and "your" refer to the named insured and spouse, if resident in the same household, it would appear than an act committed, say, by a child of the household with intent to cause a loss would be covered. Texas (ISO form HO 01 42) gives coverage to an innocent coinsured "who did not cooperate in or contribute to the creation of a loss if that 'insured' has: (1) Filed a police report; and (2) Cooperated with law enforcement investigation or prosecution relating to any other 'insured' causing the intentional loss. And, as stated earlier, Nebraska (ISO HO 01 26) gives coverage to an innocent coinsured if the loss arises out of fire, or if it arises out of abuse of the innocent insured.

 But when the language has not been modified in accordance with state law or statute, in most instances courts have upheld these modifications. In other states, courts generally find that the policy remains ambiguous in some manner.

 In National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fustons, 440 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), a fraud provision eliminating coverage for "any insured" who engaged in fraud was held not to preclude recovery by the innocent coinsured. Both husband and wife were listed as named insureds and the husband destroyed the home without the complicity or knowledge of his wife. The court adopted the reasoning of American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136 (Ind. App. 1981), holding that the word "insured" in the fraud clause was limited to the guilty spouse "in order to protect the reasonable expectation of the innocent insured that coverage would exist under such circumstances." The court noted that the insurance company could have, but did not, make such an express exclusion.

 State Farm Insurance Co. has independently filed homeowners policies with a fraud clause voiding the policy "as to you and any other insured" if "you or any other insured" commits fraud. This language was found to deny recovery to an innocent coinsured in Amick v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 862 F.2d 704 (8th Cir. Mo. 1988). (But as discussed earlier, because of state statute the homeowners policies in Missouri provide coverage for a victim of domestic violence.)

 A provision voiding the policy "if any insured has intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact" prevented recovery by an innocent coinsured after arson by her spouse in Sales v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 849 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. Ga. 1988). However, Georgia now will allow coverage for an innocent victim of domestic violence, as discussed earlier.

 The same clause was held not to preclude recovery in State Farm Fire & Casualty. Co. v. Miceli, 518 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. App. 1987). In this case, a resident relative (child) of the named insured (husband and wife) vandalized the family home and concealed material facts regarding the incident. In finding for the insureds, the court stated "we do not think it reasonable that a person in the position of [the insureds] would have supposed that the wrongdoing of his coinsured could be imputed to him…. It is unlikely that a reasonable person would agree to an insurance policy which made recovery under the policy contingent upon the action of another."

 Even with clarified language, however, insurers denying recovery to innocent coinsureds may arguably be prevented from exercising the provision. As previously mentioned, in Ponder v. Allstate, a United States district court found clarified language insufficient to deny recovery to an innocent coinsured, finding the rephrased fraud provision to be inconsistent with the provisions of the statutorily mandated Michigan Standard Fire Policy. See the discussion of this case under Early Decisions—Joint Obligations earlier in this article.

 But where the language refers to "an insured," the courts have generally found there is no coverage for an innocent coinsured. In Theriault v. Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 1999 WL 791926 (Mass. Super. August 27, 1999) the policy excluded coverage for intentional loss "meaning any loss arising out of any act committed: (1) By or at the direction of an 'insured'; and (2) With the intent to cause a loss. The court did not find this language ambiguous and added that a review of other jurisdictions construing the same language did not find it ambiguous. One of the earlier cases reviewed by the court in Theriault is Vance v. Pekin Insurance Co., 457 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa, 1990), which is interesting for its discussion of the development of law in this area. In this case, the homeowners policy fraud clause excluded coverage for intentional loss "committed by or at the direction of an insured." A husband burned down the family home without knowledge of his wife, although they remained married and living together after the loss.

 The court reviewed three lines of decisions in this area: the "old" joint obligations theory, a "rebuttable presumption" theory in which the innocent insured is allowed to "rebut the presumption of a joint obligation," and a modern "best reasoned rule" approach. Under this approach, recovery depends not on property rationales or marital relationships, but on a contract analysis of the insurance policy provisions.

 Adopting the "best reasoned rule" approach, the court analyzed the fraud provision's use of the phrase "an insured." The court held that "[t]he words 'an insured' in the above exclusion means an unspecified insured who commits arson. In short, if any insured commits arson, all insureds are barred from recovering. Citing Woodhouse v. Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Co., 785 P.2d 192 (Mont., 1990), the court agreed "[A]lthough the results are undeniably harsh for the innocent coinsured, the clear meaning of the policy must govern here. We concur with the insurer that this is, plainly and simply, a contract case. The exclusion clearly and unequivocally states that a loss caused by an intentional act of an insured party bars coverage."

 Recovery for Domestic Violence Victims

 A fairly recent development with regard to homeowners policies is to allow recovery for the innocent coinsured if the coinsured has been the subject of domestic violence. This coverage grant is found in the special provisions that contain the state-specific items, such as number of days required for nonrenewal. These are attached to the homeowners policy. As of this writing, the following states allow recovery based on loss arising out of domestic violence: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Washington.

 This is not to say that there are not limitations. Alabama's special provisions (ISO form HO 01 01) says, for example: "We do not provide coverage for any loss arising out of any act committed by or at the direction of an 'insured' with the intent to cause a loss. However, if you commit an act with the intent to cause a loss, we will provide coverage to an innocent 'insured' victim of domestic abuse, as defined in the 'Domestic Abuse Insurance Protection Act', to the extent of that person's interest in the property when the damage is proximately related to and in furtherance of domestic abuse."

 Nebraska's special provisions form (ISO form HO 01 26) states that the intentional loss exclusion "does not apply to deny coverage to an innocent 'insured' to the extent of that 'insured's' legal interest (but not exceeding the applicable limit of liability) in covered property that has sustained loss if the loss: a. Arises from the peril of fire and such innocent 'insured' did not cooperate in or contribute to the creation of the loss; or b. Arises out of abuse of the innocent 'insured' by an 'insured' who is a current or former family member or household member and is otherwise covered under Section I of the policy. We may apply reasonable standards of proof to claims for such damage. For this Exclusion 8., abuse means attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing damage to property so as to intimidate or attempt to control the behavior of another person, including a minor child."

 Other states, such as Arizona, require the innocent insured to cooperate in any investigation relating to the loss (ISO HO 01 02). North Dakota (ISO HO 01 33) says payment to an innocent coinsured will not be denied if "such loss arose out of domestic violence; and the perpetrator of the loss is criminally prosecuted for the act causing the loss." And in Hawaii (ISO HO 01 52), the insured who is the subject of domestic abuse and makes a claim for an otherwise excluded loss must file a police report and cooperate with any law enforcement investigating the act of domestic abuse. Needless to say, that insured cannot have cooperated in or contributed to the creation of the loss.

 For more information on the homeowners state amendatory endorsements, see Special Provisions—Variations by State.