Brennans argued that the damage to the Caribbean area fulfilled that element. Lexington countered that the policy requires a causal link between the prior damage and the civil authority action and that the damage must be near the insured premises to satisfy that third element. The court said that nothing in the record shows that the issuance of the evacuation order was due to physical damage to property, either distant property in the Caribbean or property in Louisiana. Therefore, the court said, it found no nexus between any prior property damage and the evacuation order.

 The court said that the "due to" language in the Lexington policy requires a close causal link by its plain terms. The civil authority order in this instance was based on fears of future damage, not on prior physical damage and so, there is no necessary causal link between prior property damage and the civil authority order. The ruling of the district court was affirmed.

 Editor's Note: The court noted the general rule is that civil authority coverage is intended to apply to situations where access to an insured's property is prevented or prohibited by an order of civil authority issued as a direct result of physical damage to other premises IN THE PROXIMITY OF the insured's property. But, it based its ruling here mainly on the point that the mandatory evacuation order was issued because of the government's fear of possible future damage; the order was not issued due to any direct physical damage to property, and this is what the policy language required.